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ABSTRACT 
 
 
My dissertation consists of three essays related to workplace behavior.  In the first 
paper, we design a controlled laboratory experiment to study image motives in a setting 
where decisions signal intelligence.  The experiment results show that in some settings 
social scrutiny can discourage individuals from making choices that signal their 
intelligence, despite evidence that the signal was privately valuable.  In the second paper, 
we study the effect of Chinese import competition on occupational safety and health at 
US manufacturers. We find that a change in US trade policy and Chinese import shocks 
significantly increases worker injury and illness rates in competing US industries, 
especially at smaller, less productive plants.  This paper presents the first evidence that 
import shocks affect welfare through changes in worker health.  Building on this, in the 
third paper we look at broader mental and physical health effects of import competition in 
local labor markets. We find that import exposure worsens overall mental, physical, and 
general health in the surrounding area.  The effects are greatest for mental health and 
among the employed, consistent with theory from the health literature pertaining to the 
documented effects of import competition on wages, employment, and job security.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three independent chapters.  The first chapter is a 
behavioral experiment studying concerns for perceived intelligence.  The latter two 
chapters study the effects of import shocks on physical and mental health outcomes for 
workers at import-competing firms and throughout the local economy.  
In the first chapter, we study image motives in an environment where economic 
decisions signal intelligence and competency.  Evidence in the social psychology 
literature explains that these traits are intrinsically and socially desirable, implying that 
actions which signal these traits are more attractive.  We design a new laboratory 
experiment to study these effects empirically.  Subjects attempt either an easier or harder 
set of verbal analogy questions and are paid for correct answers such that harder 
questions are worth more.  Payments are calibrated so that high-ability subjects earn more 
attempting the hard questions while low-types make more with the easy questions.  This 
makes choosing the hard questions a valid signal of intelligence.  Sorting behavior is 
publicly revealed in our “audience” treatment, facilitating social signaling. In the 
“intrinsic only” treatment, the signaling mechanism was explained but decisions were 
kept private. In the control, there was no discussion of the signaling mechanism and all 
decisions were private. We find that intrinsic only subjects were significantly more likely 
to choose the high-type action than the control. In comparison, subjects were significantly 
less likely to choose the signal in the audience treatment, when doing so was publicly 
observed. The effects are more pronounced in males. The results suggest that social 
observation can demotivate individuals when decisions signal intelligence, despite 
evidence that the underlying trait was privately considered desirable.  
 The second chapter looks at the relationship between trade and occupational 
safety and health, an important determinant of worker welfare that has been largely 
ignored in the literature.  Our theory explains that firms facing greater shut down risk 
reallocate resources to improve productivity at the expense of safety.  Therefore, import 
shocks worsen safety conditions at firms which are at greater risk of shutting down as a 
result.  We test this prediction with novel data on reported injuries at US manufacturers 
using growth in Chinese imports in the years 1996-2007 as a shock to competition.  The 
data show that injury rates in the competing US industries increase over the short to 
medium run, particularly at smaller establishments.  Back of the envelope calculations 
show that injury risk increases by 13 percent at the smallest establishments, costing 
workers the equivalent of a 1 to 2 percent reduction in annual wages.  This chapter 
presents the first evidence to our knowledge that import shocks affect worker welfare 
through changes in health.  These results have implications for trade and regulatory 
policy. 
 The final chapter of this dissertation builds on these findings by studying broader 
health measures, including mental health, and by looking at consequences throughout the 
economy, rather than just for workers who remain at import-competing jobs.  We find 
that average mental, physical, and general health worsens in US local labor markets 
exposed to greater Chinese import competition between 2000 and 2007.  The effects are 
greatest for mental health. Moving a region from the 25th to 75th percentile of import 
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exposure corresponds to a 5.5% increase in the time individuals report suffering from 
poor mental health, adding about 0.18 days per month.  The effects are greatest for the 
employed, consistent with theory from the health literature pertaining to the documented 
effects of import competition on wages, employment and job security.  We also find that 
import exposure in a region significantly increases the share of people unable to afford 
necessary medical care.  These estimates provide direct evidence that import exposure in 
local labor markets affects overall mental and physical well-being, as well as access to 
health care.  
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CHAPTER I 
SIGNALING SMARTS? REVEALED PREFERENCES FOR SELF 
AND SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE 
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This paper is collaborative work with Justin M. Rao at Microsoft Research. A version of 
this chapter was originally published by T. Clay McManus and Justin M. Rao: 
 
 T. Clay McManus, Justin M. Rao. “Signaling smarts? Revealed preferences for 
self and social perceptions of intelligence.” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 110 (2015): 106-118.   
 
Abstract 
We design a laboratory experiment to test for image motives in a setting where decisions 
signal intelligence to a social audience. Money-maximizing behavior in the experiment 
sorts subjects by academic ability, as measured by performance on verbal analogy 
questions, across two levels of question difficulty. Sorting behavior is publicly revealed 
in our “audience” treatment, facilitating social signaling. In the “intrinsic only” treatment, 
the signaling mechanism was explained but decisions were kept private. In the control, 
there was no discussion of the signaling mechanism and all decisions were private. We 
find that intrinsic only subjects were significantly more likely to choose the high-type 
action than the control. In comparison, subjects were significantly less likely to choose 
the signal in the audience treatment, when doing so was publicly observed. The effects 
are more pronounced in males. The results suggest that social observation can demotivate 
individuals when decisions signal intelligence, despite evidence that the underlying trait 
was privately considered desirable. Audience effects have a less predictable impact on 
behavior in this setting as compared to the near universally positive findings from the 
altruism and trust literature. Our experimental design can be easily adapted to study 
image motives in a broad set of environments using revealed preferences. 
1.1 Introduction 
There is considerable evidence that individuals alter their behavior to signal personal 
traits to a social audience and even themselves (Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Harbaugh, 
1998; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Andreoni and 
Bernheim, 2009; Karlan and McConnell, 2013). Existing studies of image motives 
typically focus on qualities that are unambiguously positive, such as generosity, altruism 
and fairness (Soetevant, 2005; Dana et al., 2007; Alpizar et al., 2008; Koch and 
Normann, 2008; Ariely et al., 2009a; Funk, 2010; Lacetera and Macis, 2010; DellaVigna 
et al., 2012), and find, with near unanimity, a positive impact of public observation. In 
this paper we study behavior that signals academic ability, a trait that is no doubt 
desirable in many settings, such as a job interview, but potentially objectionable in others, 
such as socializing with one’s peers.  
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We design a laboratory experiment that allows subjects to send credible, but 
potentially costly signals of intellectual ability and ambition.1 Our main finding is that 
when observed by others subjects distort their behavior and avoid displaying these traits. 
Instead of projecting themselves as “high types”, they opt for choices associated with 
“low-type” ability when observed by a social audience, despite evidence that the 
underlying trait was privately considered to be desirable. Our results suggest that 
observation by one’s peers can be demotivating when making choices that connote traits 
related to intelligence and ambition. 
At the center of our experiment is a mechanism for signaling intelligence. 
Subjects answered verbal analogy questions in a series of rounds and were paid a piece 
rate for each correct answer. Before each round, subjects chose to answer questions from 
either an easier set, taken from an undergraduate entrance exam (SAT), or a more 
difficult set, taken from a graduate school entrance exam (GRE), which had weakly 
higher piece rates. Incentives were designed – and empirically verified – so that subjects 
with relatively high academic ability maximized earnings by choosing the harder test and 
those with lower ability did so with the easier test. Choosing the hard test is therefore a 
credible signal that subjects may use to influence perceptions of their ability. 
Two treatment protocols and a control were used to isolate signaling motives. The 
experiment was divided into three stages. All three conditions were identical through 
stage 1 and decisions were always private in this stage. In stage 2, the “audience” 
treatment allowed subjects to signal their ability to other subjects (and the experiment 
proctor) through a straightforward procedure: they stood and were recognized if they 
answered questions from the hard test. This recognition mechanism was explained in our 
“intrinsic only” treatment as well, but subjects were truthfully informed that it was used 
in “other sessions” and their choices would remain private. Information sets were thus 
identical across the two treatment conditions through the end of stage 2 when choices 
were revealed in the audience treatment. Choices in stage 3 were private for both 
treatment conditions. In the control, subjects completed all three stages in private and 
without any mention of the recognition procedure.  
Cross-treatment comparisons of our three conditions identify the main causal 
effects of interest.  We employ a difference-in-difference strategy such that the point of 
comparison across treatments is within-subject changes in behavior relative their 
idiosyncratic baselines.2 Comparing audience to intrinsic only cleanly isolates the net 
effect of social observation, our main result.  Subjects in intrinsic only differ from control 
in that they learn that subjects were elsewhere grouped by their test choices.  We compare 
behavior in these protocols to identify the effects of this priming, including self-signaling 
and other intrinsic motives.  Lastly, comparing the audience treatment to control gives an 
                                                 
1 Social psychologists have substantiated that intelligence is an important determinant of social and self-
esteem, making it a likely domain for audience effects. Intelligence is found to be highly socially desirable 
(Park and Kraus, 1992) and associated with greater social happiness (Solomon and Saxe, 1977) and mate 
appeal (Prokosch et al., 2009; Li et al., 2002). Murphy (2007) documents behavior manipulations people 
use to convey intelligence in interpersonal communication.  See Gottfredson (1997) for a discussion on the 
pervasive importance of intelligence. 
2 The key takeaways are similar to a simple comparison of means. 
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estimate of the combined impact of social signaling and the intrinsic motives that arose 
with the mechanism’s explanation and implementation.3  
Our results are as follows.  The greatest increase in likelihood of choosing the 
hard test in stage 2 (relative the stage 1 baseline) occurred in intrinsic only, followed by 
audience and then control. The likelihood of choosing the hard test in intrinsic only 
exceeded the control by 16.8 percentage points, a magnitude that is nearly 100% of the 
base rate in the control. Subjects were also 13.2 percentage points more likely to choose 
the hard test in intrinsic only than the audience treatment. Both of these differences are 
statistically significant beyond the 5% level. The audience treatment exceeded the control 
by a statistically insignificant 3.4 percentage points. The results suggest subjects placed 
greater value on the hard questions in private after learning of the social recognition 
procedure that took place in other sessions, but were hesitant to “show off” to their peers.  
The audience exerted a negative causal effect when information sets were held constant.    
In stage 3, audience subjects were more likely to choose the hard test (in private) 
if they observed that a relatively high number of their peers had done so in stage 2.  This 
pattern is consistent with intrinsic preferences for social conformity (Lindbeck et al., 
1999).  However, we cannot separately identify a taste for conformity from social 
learning about the money maximizing strategy and leave this as an interesting effect to 
explore in future work. 
Overall, we believe the results cleanly show that signaling ability to one’s peers is 
socially undesirable in some settings. Publicizing aptitude or ambition may be counter-
productive, even if the underlying trait is privately considered to be desirable. These 
findings have implications for the effects of esteem rewards like “Employee of the 
Month” programs in the workplace and social recognition in the classroom. Aversion to 
“showing off” the otherwise valued trait may push workers or students away from the 
desired results of the program. While social recognition programs may not have a gross 
negative effect – the audience treatment was slightly more inclined to choose the hard test 
than the control – they could be improved by endorsing the underlying qualities with 
more private esteem rewards that minimize the potential scrutiny of one’s peers (or 
perhaps a subset of one’s peers). In this regard, our findings inform the growing literature 
in personnel economics on non-monetary incentives.4 
Putting our results in the context of the literature, theoretical models suggest a 
broad role for audience effects to affect the behavior of economic agents, while existing 
empirical work has focused almost exclusively on communicating fairness and altruism 
in giving decisions. In deciding to donate money or reciprocate trust, audience effects, 
self-esteem motives, and other-regarding preferences have all been found to push 
individuals in the same direction, namely towards the decision consistent with the “good” 
                                                 
3 Within-subject changes may also be affected by the dynamic effects of learning and experience in the 
experiment.  The comparison to control accounts for these effects. We thank anonymous reviewers for this 
suggestion. 
4 In a recent field study, for example, Ashraf et al., (2014) compare the effects of different non-monetary 
rewards on the training performance of health workers in Zambia. Private information on relative 
performance hurt test outcomes, a result the authors attribute to information avoidance and concerns for 
self-perceptions of ability.  
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trait. The countervailing effect of social-signaling motives in our experiment on 
intelligence stands in contrast to these findings and suggests that audience effects 
influence behavior less predictably than we previously might have thought and can 
indeed be counterproductive in some settings.   
Our final contribution is to the experimental design literature.  We introduce a 
new mechanism for laboratory experiments that can be used to test other theories of 
sorting behavior. It is particularly well-suited for studying labor market decisions and 
workplace behavior with student subjects as these tests are commonly used to assess 
students’ “job” performance and competency.5  More broadly, our methodology can be 
adapted to study image motives in a wide range of economic settings. A researcher can 
design a sorting experiment where payouts are pinned to an index of some trait of interest 
and test for audience effects in that domain by comparing behavior when the task choice 
is publicly revealed to a private baseline.6  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
experimental design, Section 3 contains the predictions for the experiment, Section 4 
provides the results, Section 5 presents a discussion, and Section 6 concludes.  Tables and 
figures are provided in Appendix A.1. 
1.2 Experiment  
The experiment took place in the University of Tennessee Experimental 
Economics Laboratory. Subjects in the experiment were students there who had 
registered to participate in economics experiments and were recruited through the Online 
Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (Greiner, 2004). They were recruited 
individually via email as our intention is to test for social signaling motives in a peer 
group without relying on pre-existing relationships or priming a group identity; where it 
existed, any familiarity between subjects in a session occurred either at random or in the 
event that individuals made plans to attend together.  
We conducted 14 sessions with a total of 148 subjects, 4 intrinsic only (IO) 
sessions with 41 subjects, 6 audience treatment (AT) sessions with 63 subjects, and 4 
control (C) sessions with 44 subjects. Each session had 8-12 subjects, seated at two rows 
of computer terminals. All decisions were entered into the computer, and the experiment 
was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects randomly drew 
their station assignment and decisions were recorded using a station identifier only so that 
                                                 
5 Performance on standardized test questions has previously been used as a real effort task to generate 
earnings (List and Cherry, 2000; Cherry et al. 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008). Our design adds to this 
paradigm with a mechanism that retains classical properties of a signaling game (i.e. individuals have 
private information of an ability measure and signaling cost is decreasing in ability). 
6 For example, an experiment might ask subjects to choose between a safe outcome and a risky gamble, 
where the probability of the high outcome depends on their gender or racial attitudes, measured by an 
Implicit Association Test, such that the value of the gamble was decreasing in the level of a subject’s bias 
towards one gender or race. If subjects are concerned with appearing unbiased to a social audience, they 
would be more inclined to choose the gamble when doing so is publicly revealed. We thank a referee for 
pointing out this generalization and example.  
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individual decisions and performance were kept anonymous to the experimenter, whose 
observation may otherwise trigger unwanted audience effects in both treatment and 
control sessions.  
 Our design needed to possess the following features: 1) subjects must be able to 
assess their own ability within the experiment and make decisions consistent with their 
ability; 2) the signaling mechanism – choosing the harder test – must form a credible 
signal of ability; 3) subjects must understand (2). We’ll now explain the details of how 
we met these requirements. 
We chose a task, verbal analogy questions from standardized tests, that we 
believed subjects would associate with intelligence. While the strength of this association 
presumably varied across subjects, we find that choosing the harder test was on average a 
valid signal of academic ability (Tables A.1 and A.2) and that subjects correctly 
interpreted it as such (Table A.3) – the presence of some subjects who did not view it as a 
meaningful measure of intelligence will only bias us towards a null results.7 In each 
round subjects were given four minutes to answer six multiple choice questions and 
earned a varying piece-rate for each correct answer. Earnings were denominated in 
tokens, with a maximum 5 tokens per correct answer, which were converted to dollars at 
the end of the experiment at a rate of 10 tokens to $1.00. Subjects were paid for every 
(correctly answered) question in the experiment. Before each round, subjects chose 
between answering from a harder set of questions, taken from the GRE (Graduate Record 
Examination), or an easier set of questions, taken from the SAT (Scholastic Aptitude 
Test). The SAT is taken by prospective undergraduate college students to assess their 
academic readiness for college, and the GRE is taken by post-baccalaureate applicants 
seeking degrees such as a Master’s or PhD. The GRE is a more difficult test by construct 
and is designed to sort a set of higher ability types.  
There were three piece rate “pairs”, one of which was randomly selected each 
round for each subject based on a known probability distribution. For each, a subject 
chose which test to take if that wage pair was implemented. The harder test paid weakly 
more in each pair. Subjects observed their draw and then attempted a set of questions 
taken from the exam they selected for that wage pair. After each round, they were shown 
their own performance and earnings. To provide familiarity with the difficulty of the two 
exams, subjects first completed a practice round of questions for each exam, in random 
order, and were paid 5 tokens for each correct answer.  
Figure A.1 shows the timeline for the experiment. The experiment was partitioned 
into three stages to isolate the behavioral channels of interest with the instructions for 
each stage directly preceding it so as to keep information sets separate. Each stage 
consisted of four decision rounds, with six questions in each. In control (C) sessions, test 
choices were kept private in every stage and there was no mention of recognition or any 
new information given during the experiment. In the two treatment protocols, stage 1 was 
a baseline and identical to control. At the beginning of stage 2, audience treatment (AT) 
subjects were informed that the end of the stage subjects would stand based on whether 
                                                 
7 Non-native speakers (about 10% of subjects in our experiment), for example, may not have felt their 
performance or decision to take the harder questions to be a valid indicator of their intelligence.  
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they answered from the (harder) GRE or the (easier) SAT for a majority of rounds. The 
standing mechanism that took place in AT was also explained to subjects in intrinsic only 
(IO) at the start of stage 2, but they were (truthfully) told that choices in their session 
would remain private. After completing stage 2 and standing, subjects in AT completed 
the third stage with the instructions that their choices thereon would remain private. 
Subjects in IO and C also completed stage 3 privately, but did so without any knowledge 
of others’ choices.  
1.2.1 Sorting 
It was necessary that money-maximizing behavior in the experiment be related to ability 
to facilitate sorting along the desired dimension and support our tests for signaling. The 
money-maximizing exam choice is determined by a subject’s relative success rate: the 
likelihood of correctly answering questions from one exam relative the other. An 
individual will maximize earnings by choosing the GRE if her relative success rate is 
greater than the ratio of piece rates. With risk-neutrality, the decision rule for choosing 
the GRE is given by: 
 
(1)  ௉ಸೃಶ௉ೄಲ೅ 	൐
௪ೄಲ೅
௪ಸೃಶ		
 
where ௝ܲ  is the success rate on exam ݆ and ݓ௝		is the piece rate offered for each correct 
answer. Risk-averse individuals, when expected earnings are equal, will maximize 
expected utility by choosing the easier SAT, as it has the lower variance in expected 
earnings.   
The success of our design is underpinned by a single-crossing condition that 
makes choosing the GRE a signal of high academic ability: individuals with higher 
ability must have higher relative success rates.  That is, it must be the case that 
individuals who do very well on the SAT tend to do well on the GRE, but individuals 
who do fair on the SAT tend to struggle considerably with the GRE. This makes sense 
from a test design point of view, as the GRE is designed to segment individuals within 
the higher end of the ability distribution. This condition was supported by simulations 
using publicly available data on test performance and the distribution of scores for our 
subject pool, University of Tennessee students. We empirically confirm signal validity 
within our experiment. 
The degree to which a pair of piece rates separates individuals depends on the 
underlying distribution of relative success rates. The use of three piece rate pairs and a 
variant of the strategy method – with nature acting as first mover – segments subjects to a 
finer level than a single pair would allow.  GRE piece rates were held constant at 5 tokens 
for simplicity and the three SAT piece rates were {3,4,5}. We henceforth refer to each 
pair of piece rates in ratio form, {0.6,0.8,1}. The wage pair was randomly selected with 
probabilities {0.25,0.5,0.25}.  
A subject who chooses to answer from the GRE for a particular SAT piece rate 
should also choose the GRE for any lower SAT piece rate. Accordingly, the strategy set 
consists of four non-dominated strategies for the three piece rate ratios {0.6,0.8,1}. They 
are: {SAT, SAT, SAT}, {GRE, SAT, SAT}, {GRE, GRE, SAT}, and {GRE, GRE, 
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GRE}. Following the decision rule above, the money-maximizing strategies based on 
success rates are shown in Figure A.2.  
The lower two piece rate ratios were chosen as targets to separate the subjects by 
ability based on simulations. Two rates were used to ensure adequate separation and 
hedge against the risk that subjects pooled into one strategy, which was of concern given 
this design had never been implemented before. The third pair was a one-to-one offer for 
the SAT and GRE piece rates, a purely wasteful signal if GRE questions are in fact more 
difficult for everyone.   
1.2.2 Audience Effects 
Subjects were read the initial instructions at the beginning of the experiment and told that 
additional instructions would be given prior to beginning each new stage. This ensured 
the observations in stage 1 were identically framed in all sessions and could serve as a 
baseline for comparison. Subjects in control sessions are not given any additional 
instructions throughout the experiment, and provide a point of comparison that accounts 
for learning and experience in the experiment but not the signaling motives introduced in 
the treatments.  
We introduce social observation in stage 2 in AT, and test for audience effects 
using an AT-IO comparison of behavior in stage 2 relative the baseline. Before beginning 
stage 2, subjects in AT were told that at the end of the subsequent four rounds those who 
attempted questions from the GRE in two or more rounds would be asked to stand at their 
station. To control for any preferences for standing and gaining social attention that are 
independent of concerns for perceived intelligence, the complementary set of subjects—
those that attempted the SAT in 3 or more rounds—then stood. A counter on the test 
selection screen displayed the number of SAT and GRE rounds that a subject had 
attempted thus far in the stage. 
The explanation of the standing procedure in AT sessions at the beginning of 
stage 2 may introduce confounding influences that are unrelated to social observation. A 
shift to the harder test may instead reflect self-esteem concerns associated with meeting 
the benchmark implicitly endorsed by the experimenter in order to self-signal intelligence 
or accomplishment. To isolate audience effects in the AT-IO comparison, we explained 
the standing mechanism to subjects in the IO treatment also, while making it clear that 
standing would not take place in their session. 
The sorting decision allowed individuals to sacrifice earnings in exchange for 
social recognition through choice of test, not performance. This distinction parallels 
giving experiments used to test for audience effects: a selfish dictator who has concerns 
for audience impressions can still signal pro-social preferences by giving without 
revealing that he is in fact selfish and would not give absent the social scrutiny.  
The randomness in selecting the offered piece rate injects noise into the social 
signal as only the exam attempted, and not one’s full strategy and the piece rate offered, 
is publicly revealed. As a result, an individual could choose the GRE for the 1:1 relative 
wage if his value for standing and signaling intelligence to the audience is sufficiently 
high. If piece rates were publicly revealed in addition to the exam chosen, choosing the 
GRE in this case would instead signal incompetence or braggadocio, as it is the less 
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profitable choice for individuals of all abilities. The cost of this method is that noise 
added to the signal weakly decreases its value for individuals concerned with social 
recognition, which will bias towards a null result.8   
After stage 2, all subjects in AT were asked to stand in place with their respective 
group for 8 seconds via a message displayed on their computer.9 In stage 3, subjects in 
both treatments and in control all completed four rounds privately. We test whether 
subjects in AT altered their behavior in stage 3 in response to the observed actions of 
others in the group.  
After finishing the experiment, subjects were asked to complete a brief 
questionnaire. The monitor who oversaw the experiment exited the room and a third-
party paid subjects in sealed envelopes. The experiment lasted approximately 90 minutes 
and earnings ranged from $9.40-$38.00, with an average of $23.66. 
1.2.3 Mechanism Performance 
Before presenting our signaling predictions and results, we appraise the design 
mechanism by assessing if subjects were sorted by underlying academic ability such that 
those who chose the GRE generally have greater ability and that, if so, subjects 
recognized this. The conditions for mechanism validity are addressed in lockstep below.  
First, the results from the experiment confirm that GRE questions were in fact 
more difficult than SAT questions. The kernel density estimates and cumulative 
distributions for the success rates on both exams are shown in Figure A.3 and Figure A.4, 
respectively. This is confirmed by a test for first-order stochastic dominance (Davidson 
and Duclos, 2000), given in Table A.4. We can thus assert that there exists, for each 
subject, a piece rate between 0 and 1 that separates her money-maximizing exam choice. 
Figure A.5 shows subjects’ average success rates on both exams and average 
strategy choice in the experiment. The rays from the origin represent the three piece rate 
ratios offered, and give the regions for money-maximizing test choices (see Figure A.2). 
Most subjects in the experiment sorted in accordance with their estimated success rates. 
Inaccurate beliefs over true success rates may have caused deviations in earlier rounds 
and we will argue that choices in later rounds were impacted by social and self-signaling 
motives. We present the quintile-quintile version of these distributions in Figure A.6. 
For the GRE to be a valid signal of intelligence, sorting must separate subjects by 
underlying academic ability. We define baseline sorting behavior by subject decisions in 
stage 1, before new information and signaling are introduced (all three experimental 
protocols are identical through this point). Using self-reported scores on the ACT, an 
undergraduate entrance exam, as an external yardstick measure of academic ability, we 
                                                 
8 The stochastic element supports the parallel to recognition mechanisms like an employee of the month 
program.  Consider a store employee and an experiment participant who respectively exhibit baseline 
behavior that assures they will not be recognized as employee of the month or a GRE-chooser.  The 
participant knows the benchmark but is uncertain of the action that will result from his choices, while the 
worker knows her actions but is uncertain whether they are enough are enough to secure recognition, but in 
both cases the recognition outcome is stochastic and the likelihood is increasing in the cost of the action 
undertaken by the agent.   
9 All subjects (in AT) followed the instructions to either stand or remain seated at the appropriate time.  
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find that the mechanism successfully sorted subjects such that GRE-choosers on average 
had significantly greater academic ability than SAT-choosers (see Table A.1).  
Finally, our design requires that subjects recognize decisions as a valid signal of 
academic ability. We affirm this using data on impressions of academic ability that were 
gathered in the post-experiment questionnaire. Subjects were asked to evaluate their 
academic ability as it compared to others in the session and indicate their relative position 
within the group.10 An individual who believes that those around him are more intelligent 
should report a lower relative position for himself, all else equal. Shown in Table A.3, 
AT subjects who observed a greater share of others choosing the GRE had significantly 
lower self-evaluations of relative academic ability.  
1.3 Predictions 
In this section, we present our hypotheses for social and self-signaling intelligence in 
the experiment and the theory and related empirical evidence that supports them.  
1.3.1 Social Signaling 
We compare behavior across AT and IO to test for social signaling motives. Subjects in 
AT stood after stage 2 to reveal which test they attempted more often, while behavior in 
IO was kept private.  The two treatment protocols are otherwise identical when subjects 
make their choices in stage 2.  This frames a clean test for our audience effects 
hypothesis. 
 
Net Positive Audience Effects Hypothesis: Subjects in AT are more likely to choose the 
GRE in stage 2 than subjects in IO. 
 
The hypothesis is motivated by findings that individuals distort behavior so as to 
signal themselves to others as altruistic or fair (Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni and 
Bernheim, 2009; Lacetera and Macis, 2010), and evidence in social psychology that 
suggests intelligence, like altruism, is a socially desirable trait (Park and Kraus, 1992). 
The only difference between AT and IO is that choices were publicly revealed in the 
former, so that observed changes in behavior are attributable to the presence of a social 
audience. A difference-in-difference comparison allows us to test if the audience effect 
leads to a positive difference in signaling motives on net. We call this the net positive 
audience effects hypothesis to reflect the distinction that audience effects must be 
                                                 
10 Specifically, we adapted Svenson’s (1981) question on driving confidence: “We would like to know 
about what you think about your academic ability. We want you to compare your academic ability to the 
academic abilities of other people in this experiment. By definition, someone has the greatest level of 
academic ability in the room and someone has the lowest level of academic ability in the room. We want 
you to indicate your own estimated position compared to others in this experimental group. Of course, this 
is a difficult question because you cannot be entirely sure based only on your experiences and you do now 
know all the people gathered here today, but please make the most accurate estimate you can.” Subjects 
were asked to indicate there position along a line of radio buttons from lowest academic ability in the room 
to highest, each representing a decile in the distribution. 
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stronger than any crowd-out of internal motivations (discussed below). There is evidence 
that extrinsic rewards, such as money or public recognition, can lessen the intrinsic value 
of signaling choices (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b; Meier, 2007; Mellstrӧm and 
Johannesson, 2008).  If the public nature of the decision damages the intrinsic reward for 
choosing the hard questions, the net audience effect will only be positive if social rewards 
outweigh this moderating effect.  
1.3.2 Self Signaling and Other Intrinsic Motives 
Although our experiment is primarily designed to test for social signaling motives, the 
description of the standing procedure in IO serves as a prime that could excite internal 
motivations.  Just as individuals may alter their behavior in our experiment so as to affect 
others’ perceptions of them, evidence from psychology and related work in economics 
suggests self-image concerns may motivate subjects to choose the GRE in private when 
they recognize it as a signal of intelligence.  Psychologists posit that individuals assess 
their own behaviors like they assess the behavior of others, adopting the role of outside 
observer in forming self-perceptions (Bem, 1972). Self-impression management theory 
explains that people are consequently motivated to show themselves in a positive light, 
even when they are the only member of the audience (Baumeister, 1998).  Related 
economic models of self-image and ego explain that signaling actions affect agents’ self-
impressions when they are unable or unwilling to introspect the true motives behind them 
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2002, 2004, 2006; Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Koszegi, 2006).  
Giving experiments find evidence of self-signaling in that environment.11  We compare 
behavior in IO in stage 2 to the control to test for self-signaling and other intrinsic 
motivations primed by the explanation of the signaling mechanism.   
 
Intrinsic Motivation Hypothesis: Subjects in IO are more likely to choose the GRE in 
Stage 2 than subjects in control.  
 
While we have motivated this hypothesis with a discussion of self-signaling, we 
give it the more general “intrinsic motivation” label because we are unable to 
independently identify self-signaling motives from other priming effects, such as 
endorsement or recommendation effects. Indeed it may well be impossible to distinguish 
some of these motivations from the self-signaling hypothesis because they are often 
implicit in any esteem reward mechanism.  For example, publicly or privately conferring 
awards for hitting $ݔ in sales in a month or scoring a grade of ݔ on a school assignment 
makes ݔ a more salient outcome and induces endorsement and demand effects, in 
addition to providing a vehicle for affecting self- or social-esteem. This tight link means 
we cannot cleanly disentangle these motives in our experiment.  
 Relatedly, the conformity literature suggests that self-impression concerns will 
push subjects towards the revealed “norm” after observing the decisions of others 
(Lindbeck et al., 1999). We use stage 3 choices in AT to identify how the distribution of 
                                                 
11 Murnighan et al. (2001), Dana et al. (2007), Lazear et al. (2012), and Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2013) find 
evidence of self-signaling altruism or fairness, while Grossman (2012) finds contradicting results. 
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others’ choices affects the (private) behavior that follows, but we cannot separate internal 
pressures to conform from social learning about their money-maximizing strategy since 
both may compel subjects to take the GRE when they observe others doing so. 
Accordingly, we do not list this as a formal hypothesis. 
1.4 Results 
The mean likelihoods of choosing the GRE in each stage are shown in Figure A.7. 
The middle piece rate is where all the interesting action is. The monetary incentives 
dominate for the other two piece rates. For Pair 1 (ݓௌ஺் ൌ 0.6ݓீோா), the strong majority 
of subjects chose the GRE in the baseline and behavior is very similar across all 
conditions. The monetary incentive similarly dominates in Pair 3 (ݓௌ஺் ൌ ݓீோா), where 
the GRE was suboptimal for all money-maximizers and the costliest signaling action. 
Recall that the middle piece rate was selected to be implemented 50% of the time, as it 
was our prior that this is the wage that would separate subjects. In AT a subject who 
selected the GRE for the middle piece rate each round had a 95% chance of “standing” 
(attempting 2 or more GRE rounds in stage 2), relative a 26% chance if selecting the 
GRE for the lower piece rate only.  
The aggregate results for the middle piece rate suggest that subjects were 
motivated to choose the GRE when it was framed as a signal and decisions were private, 
but were not so motivated when doing so was socially recognized. We use pooled OLS to 
estimate a linear probability model of the likelihood of choosing the GRE as a function of 
treatment status and stage, and use a difference-in-difference approach to identify the 
treatment effects.12 The probability of selecting the GRE for a particular piece rate is 
modeled as: 
 
(2)  Prሺtest ൌ GRE|piece	rate ൌ rሻ ൌߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵܵଶ ൅ ߚଶܵଶ ூܶை ൅ ߚଷܵଶ ஺்ܶ 	൅	ߚସܵଷ ൅ 
 
ߚହܵଷ ூܶை ൅ ߚ଺ܵଶ ஺்ܶ ൅ 	ߛRSRୟ୬୲ୣ ൅ ߜ1ୖୗୖ౗౤౪౛ஹ୰ ൅ ߠ ൅ ݑ 
 
where ூܶை and ஺்ܶ are indicators for the two treatment groups, ௝ܵ is an indicator for a 
round in stage ݆, ܴܴܵ௔௡௧௘ is the ratio of success rates for all questions attempted in prior 
rounds, and ߠ is an individual fixed effect. Also included is an indicator for whether the 
subject’s relative success rate for the full experiment is higher than the piece rate 
(indicating the GRE to be the money-maximizing choice).  
Shown in Table A.5, the results indicate that the likelihood of selecting the GRE 
was increasing in the relative success rate observed in earlier rounds.  This suggests that 
subjects updated their beliefs based on observed performance and correctly responded to 
                                                 
12 The results of a pooled logit model support our main results at the 5% level also, but we prefer the OLS 
specification given its consistency under unspecified heteroskedasticity and with subject fixed effects and a 
relatively small number of observations for each (36 pair-rounds). Of further appeal, the linear specification 
provides straightforward estimates for the marginal effects of treatment and stage on the probability of 
taking the hard exam.  
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this information. Also, subjects whose relative success rates exceeded the threshold were 
more likely to choose the GRE for the two separating piece rates, as designed. 
We use the difference-in-difference estimates for the middle piece rate from our 
main specification (coefficients in column 2) to test for audience effects and intrinsic 
motives. These estimates are shown in the first column of Table A.6. In support of our 
intrinsic motivation hypothesis, the IO-C comparison for stage 2 reveals that subjects 
were 16.8 percentage points more likely to choose the GRE after the standing mechanism 
was explained but not implemented. The result is consistent with self-esteem concerns 
attached to meeting the benchmark associated with intelligence. 
Subjects in AT, in contrast, were only weakly more likely to choose the GRE in 
stage 2 when social recognition was introduced than the control. Counter to our positive 
audience effects hypothesis, social recognition did not motivate subjects in the 
experiment to choose the GRE, despite evidence that doing so was a valid and 
recognizable signal of academic ability. In fact, subjects in AT were 13.4 percentage 
points less likely to choose the GRE in the second stage of the experiment than subjects 
in IO. The interpretation of this behavior is discussed below. 
We estimate the main specification for each gender separately and present the 
difference-in-difference estimates in columns 2 and 3 of Table A.6.   We find that the 
observed effects were greatest among male participants.  Males were 18 percentage 
points less likely to choose the GRE in AT than they were in IO. Gender differences in 
these environments could be investigated more thoroughly in future work. 
Lastly, we examine the impact of the publically revealed signals on future 
behavior. We use a linear probability specification similar to our preferred specification 
to test whether subjects in AT were on average more likely to choose the GRE if they 
observed that a greater share of other participants in the session had been doing so.13 
Without time-varying information on this belief measure, we cannot use individual fixed 
effects in the estimating equation. We include individual characteristics observed in our 
data to control for other determinants of behavior. The results are presented in Table A.7. 
Subjects were significantly more likely to choose the GRE if they witnessed that a 
larger share of others has done so. We estimate that for a session of ten participants, 
seeing an additional person stand for taking the GRE increased the likelihood that an 
observer chose the GRE for the middle piece rate by 3 percentage points at the mean. As 
mentioned in the introduction, this difference could occur through self-image 
(conformity) channels or subjects updating their perception of the money-maximizing 
strategy through social observation. 
1.5 Discussion 
1.5.1 The Sorting Mechanism 
Related work has looked at the effects of a social audience on performance (Mas and 
Moretti, 2009; Ariely et al. 2009b; Bandiera et al., 2013; Ashraf et al., 2014), but in these 
                                                 
13 This measure is assumed to be orthogonal to a subject’s own choices as decisions remained private 
information through stage 2. 
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protocol intentional distortions in behavior—such as those suggested by our 
experiment—are indistinguishable from involuntary changes in response to social 
scrutiny, such as anxiety. For example, Ariely et al. (2009b) finds that individuals solving 
anagrams for a piece rate perform worse when they complete the task in front of others 
than when they do so in private. They posit that this underperformance is the result of 
“choking” under the added social incentives of performing well. Our findings raise an 
alternative explanation, namely that individuals might underperform because they do not 
want to be socially observed as doing well on the task. Our mechanism gets around this 
problem by creating a wedge between signaling and task performance. Importantly, we 
retain signal credibility when creating this wedge – even though performance is never 
revealed to any other participant. This could be particularity useful in studying more 
sensitive topics such as racial attitudes.  
Our results demonstrate that the mechanism can effectively sort subjects by 
academic ability and serve as a credible signal. The results can also help calibrate the 
choice of wages for future studies. For our subjects at a major state university a single 
piece rate ratio of 0.75 would evenly separate individuals across the two exams and 
maximize the number of subjects on the margin of the decision rule, who are the most 
likely to distort behavior in response to non-pecuniary incentives. This value can be 
tailored to any U.S. institution using publicly available data on admissions test scores (a 
procedure we followed and validated).  
1.5.2 Audience Effects in the Experiment 
We find empirical evidence that social observation has more nuanced effects on behavior 
than has previously been found. If social signaling is not unambiguously attractive, the 
presence of an audience may influence behavior in different ways than is described by 
findings from experiments focusing on giving and altruism. We find that social 
observation discouraged signaling intellectual ability and ambition in our experiment. In 
fact, the negative audience effect almost entirely swamped positive internal motivations 
excited by our experimental prime, such that the overall effect was only slightly positive 
but not significant.  
Of course, the audience effects we observe are determined by the private and 
social value placed on signaling a particular dimension of ability – at Ivy League schools, 
for example, we might see the directionality of the audience effect reversed. Nonetheless, 
our findings suggest that in some settings social observation can undo rather than 
reinforce the desire to behave in manner consistent with the endorsed trait, and that this 
can occur even when the trait is privately considered to be desirable.14 We’ll now discuss 
three explanations for this result. These explanations can have very different 
implications, highlighting the nuanced impact an audience can have in these 
environments. 
 
“Smarty Pants” Effect 
                                                 
14 In an example of positive audience effects in a related dimension, the aforementioned Ashraf et al. 
(2014) finds that social recognition improved test performance for the Zambian health trainees.  
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A straightforward explanation of the result is that students at the University of Tennessee 
did not want to be seen by their peers as having high academic ability or as trying too 
hard in the experiment. Subjects also often turned in their answers early (63% of the time 
with at least one minute remaining); though doing so did not expedite the experiment, it 
could be inferred by others in the session whether one was working on the task or had 
finished.15 This behavior is consistent with models of attention avoidance and conformity 
(Bernheim, 1994) if subjects believed ex-ante that the majority would choose the easier 
questions. Choosing the harder test questions could have instead been associated with 
arrogance or a type of intelligence that is socially undesirable. This explanation would be 
particularly important for “Employee of the Month” programs or public recognition 
programs in schools. An interesting aspect of this explanation is that knowing 
individuals’ private assessment of a trait is not sufficient to predict how they will feel 
about publicly expressing it. 
 
Social Preferences 
Social preferences offer another explanation for the negative treatment effect observed in 
our experiment. Bandiera et al. (2005) studies the productivity of fruit pickers under both 
piece rate pay and relative incentives, and find that productivity is at least 50% higher 
under piece rate pay. They find that workers internalize the negative externality that their 
effort imposes on others when pay is determined by relative output. If subjects in our 
experiment recognize that standing for taking the GRE affects the self-esteem of others in 
the session and have social preferences over their utility, choosing the GRE would be 
relatively less attractive than it otherwise would. Decisions in IO sessions (and control) 
were private and therefore this externality was not present. These motives would not 
impact an “Employee of the Month”-type programs in which there is always one winner, 
but have an impact when the number of “winners” is endogenous.  
 
Motivational Crowding Out 
Introducing the social recognition reward may have altered the perception of choosing the 
GRE for subjects in AT as compared to IO. It’s possible the internal motivations for 
choosing the GRE were not the same across the two treatment sessions because the social 
reward dampened the intrinsic value of attempting the harder questions, just as extrinsic 
rewards for giving have been found to “crowd out” intrinsic motivations (Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b; Meier, 2007; Mellström and 
Johannesson, 2008; Holmås et al., 2010) and image motivations (Ariely et al. 2009a). The 
negative AT-IO difference in stage 3 is consistent with Meier’s (2007) finding that 
crowding out persists even after the extrinsic incentives are removed. An important note 
for future work is that motivational crowding out cannot lead individuals to choose the 
high-type action less when it’s framed as a social signal than they otherwise would absent 
                                                 
15 Recessed computers with privacy screens ensured decisions were private, but there were not dividers in 
the lab so it was observable to others whether or not a subject was interacting with the terminal. Subjects 
who finished early were observed emitting behaviors such as reclining in the chairs with their arms crossed 
or hands on their head. 
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any signaling motives, whereas the smarty pants effect and social preferences can have a 
gross negative impact. Given that the audience treatment and control were not 
statistically different we cannot speak definitively on this issue in this paper. 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we design a sorting mechanism for laboratory experiments that separates 
subjects by academic ability. Sorting decisions served as a valid and recognized signal of 
ability, and subjects could make costly changes in behavior so as to signal their ability. 
The experiment retains the important characteristics of sorting mechanisms in the real 
world, and may be viable for future tests of signaling theory. We use the experiment to 
test previously unanswered predictions on how audience effects impact signaling 
intelligence to one’s peers. 
We find that social observation discouraged subjects from signaling academic 
ability, despite evidence that the underlying trait was privately considered to be desirable 
by revealed preferences in our intrinsic only condition. Our findings illustrate the 
difference in audience effects in signaling ability to one’s peers as compared to giving 
decisions, which have been the primary focus of prior work. In contrast to those settings, 
here the social value of signaling ability is not unambiguously positive, and social 
observation can actually be demotivating as compared to privately conferred esteem 
rewards. These findings have substantial practical importance as well, in particular for the 
use of recognition programs in schools and the workplace that rely on the positive impact 
of audience effects.   
In looking at intelligence, our study contributes evidence of audience effects in an 
altogether new domain where choices signal ability. Broadly, our results support a wider 
role for audience effects than has been previously studied and our experiment paradigm – 
linking task payouts to an index of some trait like intelligence and then varying social 
observation of sorting – can be easily adapted for future studies of audience effects in 
other settings. 
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Appendix A.1 Tables and Figures 
Table A.1. Comparison of Means for Ability Measures, Based on Baseline Sorting 
 First Piece Rate  Second Piece Rate 
Ability Measure SAT GRE Diff.  SAT GRE Diff. 
ACT Scores 25.90   (0.74) 
27.37 
  (0.42) 
2.07** 
  (0.85)  
26.85   
  (0.42) 
29.09    
  (0.72) 
2.24*** 
  (0.83) 
GPA 3.174     
  (0.087) 
3.370    
  (0.044) 
0.196* 
  (0.098)  
3.317  
  (0.047) 
3.333  
  (0.759) 
0.016  
  (0.089) 
Earnings 20.84 
  (0.93) 
24.55 
  (0.52) 
3.71***    
  (1.00)  
23.44    
  (0.52) 
24.17 
  (1.00) 
0.73   
  (1.13) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. GRE-choosers defined by those who chose GRE for the 
piece rate in at least 2/4 rounds of the stage (analogous to signaling criteria).  ACT scores and GPA were 
self-reported in questionnaire. Sample used in estimation excludes participant who did not correctly answer 
an SAT question in any round (incl. practice).  In the spirit of the design, earnings in the experiment should 
be a viable proxy for academic ability.  The results for the first piece rate show that earnings are 
significantly higher among those that sorted into the GRE.  The difference is negligible across the two 
groups for the middle piece rate, however.  One explanation is that for higher piece rates, fewer subjects 
optimally choose the GRE.  Those “over-chasing” the GRE due to nonmonetary incentives or incorrect 
beliefs make up a relatively greater share of the group for higher piece rates and also earn less by behaving 
suboptimally, lowering the average and countering the predicted result.   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.2. Strength of the GRE as a Signal of Ability, Based on Baseline Sorting 
 Probability that GRE-chooser has higher ability than  SAT-chooser 
Measure of Ability  First Piece Rate Second Piece Rate 
ACT Scores 0.64** 0.66*** 
GPA 0.61** 0.51 
Earnings 0.68*** 0.55 
Notes: Significance levels are from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the hypothesis that the ability measure is 
different for GRE-choosers and SAT-choosers. Subjects are grouped by their majority choice in stage 1 for 
the respective piece rates (with the tie going to the GRE, like the decision rule for standing).  ACT scores 
and GPA were self-reported in the questionnaire. Excludes participant who did not correctly answer an SAT 
question during the practice round or a decision round. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.3. Academic Ability: Self-Evaluated as Percentile Within Session 
Audience 
Treatment 
Intrinsic 
Treatment ൅	Control 
Constant 60.407*** 61.505*** 
(5.295) (5.390) 
Percentile on Undergrad Entrance Exam 0.370*** 0.132* 
(0.070) (0.075) 
Percent of Others Who Stood for GRE‡ -0.197** 0.010 
(0.085) (0.010) 
Observations 58 64 
R-square 0.344 0.07 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The second regressor is a subject’s ACT score 
percentile within the distribution of experiment participants.  
‡Subjects in intrinsic only and control were not asked to stand, but the share who qualified to stand 
is included as a regressor there as a point of comparison.  A program crash in an intrinsic only 
session damaged the questionnaire data for those subjects.  They are necessarily excluded from 
these regressions, as are subjects who declined to answer the relevant survey questions.   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.4. Success Rate Densities and FOSD Test Statistics 
 Densities Davidson-Duclos t-statistic:   
Success Rate SAT GRE ࡲࡿሺ࢞ሻ ൑ ࡲࡳሺ࢞ሻ ∀ ࢞ 
0.39 0.05 0.28 5.62 
0.46 0.12 0.43 6.22 
0.52 0.17 0.61 8.80 
0.59 0.24 0.73 9.73 
0.66 0.41 0.82 8.00 
0.73 0.56 0.95 8.80 
0.80 0.76 0.99 6.14 
0.86 0.91 0.99 3.50
0.93 0.99 1.00 1.42   
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Table A.5. Probability of Selecting the GRE by Piece Rate: Pooled OLS Estimates 
 
Pair 1: 
ݓௌ஺் ൌ 0.6ݓீோா 
Pair 2: 
ݓௌ஺் ൌ 0.8 ∙ ݓீோா 
Pair 3: 
ݓௌ஺் ൌ ݓீோா 
Stage 2 0.051 -0.066** 0.010 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.044) 
Stage 2 x IO 0.036 0.168*** -0.014 
 (0.060) (0.039) (0.055) 
Stage 2 x AT 0.068 0.034 -0.058 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.050) 
Stage 3 -0.001 -0.085* -0.019 
 (0.062) (0.049) (0.029) 
Stage 3 x IO 0.108 0.173** 0.032 
 (0.082) (0.068) (0.050) 
Stage 3 x AT 0.079 0.053 -0.034 
 (0.073) (0.068) (0.039) 
Money-Maximizing 0.269*** 0.118** 0.040 
 (0.065) (0.053) (0.091) 
Relative Success Rate in  0.240*** 0.331*** 0.186*** 
Previous Rounds (0.065) (0.067) (0.043) 
Observations 5262   
R-square 0.571   
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Estimates are from a pooled OLS regression for all pair 
choices.  Regression includes pair and subject fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by both 
subject and by session-stage using variance estimator from Cameron et al. (2011). 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.6. Difference-in-Difference Estimates for Middle Piece Rate: Changes in 
Probability of Selecting GRE Relative Stage 1 Baseline 
Stage 2 Full Sample Men Women 
Control -0.066** 
    (0.028) 
-0.019 
    (0.032) 
-0.113*** 
    (0.041) 
Intrinsic only 0.102*** 
    (0.022) 
0.164*** 
    (0.050) 
-0.020 
    (0.060) 
Audience Treatment -0.033 
    (0.048) 
-0.013 
    (0.060) 
-0.048 
    (0.062) 
IO-C Diff. 
 
0.168*** 
    (0.039) 
0.182** 
    (0.073) 
0.093 
    (0.073) 
AT-C Diff. 0.034 
    (0.056) 
0.005 
    (0.074) 
0.066 
    (0.071) 
AT-IO Diff. -0.134** 
    (0.055) 
-0.177** 
    (0.085) 
-0.027 
    (0.095) 
Stage 3 Full Sample Men Women 
Control -0.085* 
    (0.049) 
-0.012 
    (0.061) 
-0.159** 
    (0.066) 
Intrinsic only 0.089* 
    (0.048) 
0.170 
    (0.111) 
-0.051 
    (0.041) 
Audience Treatment -0.032 
    (0.053) 
-0.024 
    (0.075) 
-0.032 
    (0.070) 
IO-C Diff. 
 
0.173** 
    (0.068) 
0.182 
    (0.133) 
0.108 
    (0.072) 
AT-C Diff. 0.053 
    (0.068) 
-0.013 
    (0.097) 
0.127 
    (0.082) 
AT-IO Diff. -0.120* 
    (0.070) 
-0.194 
    (0.136) 
0.019 
    (0.084) 
Observations 5262 2661 2193 
R-square 0.571 0.618 0.555 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Estimates are from pooled OLS 
regressions for all pair choices, first for the full sample and then for each gender 
subsample.  Each regression includes pair and subject fixed effects.   Robust standard 
errors are clustered by both subject and by session-stage using variance estimator from 
Cameron et al. (2011).  Full sample includes subjects without gender information from 
questionnaire; excluding them does not significantly affect the results. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.7. Probability of Selecting the GRE as a Function of Others Seen Doing So 
 
Pair 1: 
ݓௌ஺் ൌ 0.6 ∙ ݓீோா 
Pair 2: 
ݓௌ஺் ൌ 0.8 ∙ ݓீோா 
Pair 3: 
ݓௌ஺் ൌ ݓீோா 
Optimal 0.507*** -0.017 0.287*** 
     (0.187)     (0.065)     (0.0935) 
Relative Success Rate in  0.185 0.914*** 0.0005 
Previous Rounds     (0.267)     (0.282)     (0.0421) 
Percentage of Others Seen 
Choosing the GRE 
0.0017  
    (0.0011) 
0.0029***
    (0.0008) 
0.0012*** 
    (0.0004) 
Percentile on Undergraduate  -0.009 -0.114 -0.063** 
Entrance Exam      (0.197)     (0.089)     (0.030) 
Observations 696   
R-square 0.643   
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  Estimates are from a pooled OLS regression for all pair 
choices.  Regression includes pair fixed effects, a gender dummy, and school year dummies for each piece 
rate pair. Robust standard errors are clustered by both subject and by session using variance estimator from 
Cameron et al. (2011).  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 Figure A.1. Experiment Timeline 
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Figure A.2. Money-Maximizing Strategies by Success Rates 
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Figure A.3. Kernel density estimates of success rates for SAT and GRE questions. 
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Figure A.4. Cumulative distribution of subject success rates for SAT and GRE 
questions. 
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Figure A.5. Subject success rates in the experiment, colored by exam choice. 
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Figure A.6. Quintile-quintile plot of subject success rates on SAT and GRE 
questions. 
Notes: Each point on the scatter plot represents a percentile and the coordinates reflect 
the associated success rate for questions from each exam.  It seems reasonable that the 
rank order of subjects based on their true ability on SAT verbal analogy questions is 
quite similar to that for the GRE.   
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Figure A.7. Mean Likelihood of selecting the GRE by condition for each piece rate 
pair. 
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participant. This ensures that no other subject or the experimenter will know your 
earnings. 
 
Summary 
 
 You will answer test questions and earn tokens for correct answers; these are 
converted to cash at the end. 
 Prior to each round, you choose to answer from either the SAT (generally easier) 
or the GRE for three different cases. 
 The pay rates for correct answers are different for each of the three cases. 
 It is in your best interest to choose the test you would like to take for each case if 
it is selected; there is an Earnings Calculator and your previous decisions are 
listed to help you decide. 
 You have 4 minutes to answer 6 questions in each round. 
 We’ll repeat this for 12 rounds. 
 
 
Treatment-Specific Instructions Follow Below 
 
These instructions will be read aloud, and hard copies will not be distributed. 
 
After Round 4 
 
[AT] You have now completed 4 rounds. In the next block of 4 rounds we are 
introducing a new feature of the experiment. After the next 4 rounds are complete, 
participants will stand in two groups.  Those participants who take GRE questions in 2 or 
more of the next 4 rounds will be asked to stand. They will remain standing for 8 seconds 
and then return to sitting.  Those participants who did not take the GRE in 2 or more of 
the next 4 rounds will then be asked to stand for 8 seconds.  They will return to sitting 
and the experiment will proceed.   
 
[IO] You have now completed 4 rounds.  In the next block of 4 rounds a new feature of 
the experiment is introduced in some sessions: subjects who take GRE questions in 2 or 
more rounds will be asked to stand.  This will not occur in this session.  All of your 
decisions will remain private throughout the experiment.   
 
[Control] You have now completed 4 rounds.  The next block of 4 rounds will proceed 
exactly as the first 4 rounds. 
 
After Round 8 
 
[In AT, subjects were asked to stand with their respective groups via a message on their 
computer screens.  All subjects were shown the following: “At this point, participants 
who have answered questions from the GRE in 2 or more of the previous 4 rounds will 
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stand”.  Below this, subjects were shown either “You have answered GRE questions in 2 
or more of the previous 4 rounds.  Please stand at this time” or “You have not answered 
questions from the GRE in 2 or more of the previous 4 rounds.  Please remain seated at 
this time.” After the appropriate subjects stood and returned to sitting, this was repeated 
for the complementary criterion of 3 or more SAT questions.] 
 
[AT and IO] The final 4 rounds will be just like the first 4. Nobody will be asked to stand 
after these rounds no matter what their choices. After these 4 rounds, the experiment will 
conclude.  
 
[Control] The final 4 rounds will be just like the previous rounds.  After these 4 rounds, 
the experiment will conclude. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EFFECTS OF IMPORT COMPETITION ON WORKER 
HEALTH 
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This paper is collaborative work with Georg Schaur at the University of Tennessee. 
Abstract 
Occupational safety and health is an important determinant of workers’ welfare. Our 
theory predicts that firms facing greater shut down risk reallocate resources to improve 
productivity at the expense of safety. Therefore, at firms facing the greatest shutdown 
risk due to import competition, safety conditions worsen following an import shock. We 
test this prediction with novel data on reported injuries at US manufacturers using growth 
in Chinese imports in the years 1996-2007 as a shock to competition. The data show that 
injury rates in the competing US industries increase over the short to medium run, 
particularly at smaller establishments. Back of the envelope calculations show that injury 
risk increases by 13 percent at the smallest establishments, costing workers the equivalent 
of a 1 to 2 percent reduction in annual wages. 
2.1 Introduction 
Health and injury outcomes are important to workers and firms.  Estimates reveal that in 
2007 US firms and workers saw as many as 9M occupational injuries and illnesses, 
60,000 of which were fatal, that resulted in about 250B in costs to workers, firms and 
taxpayers (Leigh, 2011).  Injury rates at US manufacturers are among the highest of any 
industry.16  These same firms and workers also continue to see significant import 
competition from low cost markets, China in particular, which has important wage and 
employment effects.  Labor standards, health and safety conditions are an important part 
of the employment contract, but have not been examined in the face of trade 
liberalizations or import competition.  In this paper we ask if import competition from 
foreign markets affects injuries and worker health in US firms.    
The link between import competition and worker injuries is supported by the 
intersection of evidence from the respective literatures.  Import competition impacts firm 
survival (Pierce and Schott, 2013; Bloom et al., 2012, Bernard et al., 2006a, 2006b), labor 
markets (Autor et al., 2013), and firm investments in new technology (Ederington and 
McCalman, 2009).  Literature on occupational safety and health (OSH) shows that 
injuries are determined by the relative priority the firm places on safety aside other goals 
like output (Zohar, 2000, 2002), technology upgrading and investments, and labor market 
conditions (Probst and Brubaker, 2001).  Together, the bodies of literature suggest that 
foreign competition will impact occupational injuries and worker welfare by affecting the 
firms’ incentives related to output and safety.  Welfare evaluations based on wages alone 
miss this effect of trade on workers’ welfare. 
We combine plant-level panel data on injuries and illnesses at US manufacturers 
from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) with an industry and 
time varying measure of Chinese import competition, adapted from recent work by 
                                                 
16 There were 4.6 injury and illness cases per 100 workers in manufacturing in 2012, compared to 3.8 in 
natural resources and mining and 3.7 in construction. (Bureau of Labor Statistics)  
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Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013).  We apply differencing, fixed-effect and instrumental 
variable strategies to identify the causal effect of trade liberalization and supply-driven 
import shocks on injury and illness rates at competing domestic firms.   
The estimates show that import competition has significant consequences for 
worker injuries.  Import competition raises injury rates for all but the largest plants.  The 
effect is greatest for the smallest plants.  Looking at five-year log differences, the 
estimated elasticity of injury rates with respect to Chinese supply shocks is about 0.107 at 
the smallest decile of plants (p<0.01) and 0.085 at the median (p<0.05).  Moving an 
industry from the 25th to the 75th percentile of total Chinese import growth increases 
injury rates by about 12% at the smallest decile of plants in the industry and 10% at the 
median.   
Looking at worker welfare, estimates from the value of statistical life and injury 
literature show that the increases in injury risk resulting from Chinese import shocks are 
important in magnitude and are equivalent to wage decreases of approximately 0.4 – 1.6 
percent.17  For comparison, Arkolakis et al. (2012) discuss gains in real income due to 
trade liberalization of 1.4 percent.  If variable trade costs are eliminated, Melitz and 
Redding (forthcoming) find a welfare effect of 17 percent.  In total, we estimate that 
Chinese supply shocks in the US were responsible for between 62,000 and 90,000 
injuries and illnesses annually during 2001-2007, about 7 percent of all cases in 
manufacturing, and a total loss to worker welfare between $2.2 and $9 billion each year.  
With this in mind, the effects of import competition on injuries are an important channel 
to consider for welfare overall and among workers at small plants in particular. 
Differencing and fixed effect strategies mitigate the effect of unobserved plant, 
industry and geography specific characteristics.  In addition, we tackle four identification 
problems.  First, we consider long and short time differences to distinguish between short 
and long run effects of import competition and injuries.  Second, underreporting is a 
recognized concern with self-reported injury data; workers hide or work through injuries 
rather than report them due to fear of being fired later on (Boone et al., 2011; Boone and 
van Ours, 2006).  We discuss literature and incentives that mitigate the issue of 
misreporting and as a robustness check we estimate the model separately on the rates of 
injuries by severity and therefore susceptibility to misreporting.  Third, it is difficult to 
identify exogenous trade shocks.  In addition to instrumental variable techniques based 
on Autor et al., we identify import competition by adopting a liberalization in US trade 
policy towards China as a natural policy experiment according to Pierce and Schott 
(2013).  Finally, an identification assumption we maintain throughout is that small plants, 
those with fewer employees, are less productive and therefore face a greater threat of 
insolvency from import competition.  Findings in Holmes and Stevens (2014) provide an 
alternative explanation.  Very small plants – and especially those located close to 
metropolitan areas – produce specialty goods and are therefore shielded from import 
competition.  We perform robustness exercises that exclude plants from the sample that 
                                                 
17 Estimates for the value of injuries vary across studies but generally range from 75% to 200% of yearly 
income.  See Viscusi (1993) for a survey, and Hersch (1998) and Leeth and Ruser (2003) for later work. 
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are more likely to be specialized based on size, industry, and metropolitan location to 
show that specialized firms are not driving our results.     
Our theory motivates why import competition raises injuries at small firms in the 
short run.  At the firm, managers increase output by extracting greater effort from 
workers, but this increases the risk of injury.  When making these decisions, firms 
consider the long term costs and the reputation effects of additional injuries.  Because 
firms are judgment proof and future costs like higher insurance premiums, demand 
penalties, and productivity losses only matter if the firm is operational, the expected long 
run costs of injuries today are decreasing in the probability of the firm shutting down.  
Therefore, because import competition lowers the probability of firm survival, especially 
for less productive firms in the market, marginal firms respond by raising productivity at 
the cost of more injuries.  Existing models are silent with respect to these short term firm-
level adjustment effects.  Comparing steady state equilibria before and after trade 
liberalizations, the least productive firms simply drop out.    
Bloom et al. (2012) finds that the growth in Chinese imports in Europe 
significantly increased the average total factor productivity in competing domestic 
industries as a result of both low productivity-firm exit and improvements within 
surviving firms.  Sources of observed intra-firm productivity gains include, in support of 
our theoretical approach, manager adjustments to improve factor productivity and 
increase firm survival (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007).18  Also consistent with our 
intuition, Lazear et al. (2013) finds empirical evidence that firm’s productivity gains 
during a recession are the result of getting more effort from their workers.19 Our model 
shows that this happens because of a fall in the firm’s survival prospects, and it generally 
explains how recessions, demand shocks, greater domestic competition, and other market 
shocks affect productivity and workplace safety. 
Existing models’ predictions regarding the long-run labor market effects of trade 
provide some useful insight for how import competition affects occupational health, an 
important component of the employment contract.  Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and 
Amiti and Davis (2011) consider fair wage mechanisms where firms share rents with 
their workers to keep them from shirking on the job. Helpman et al. (2011) considers a 
labor market with search frictions where firms and workers bargain over the rents of a 
successful match.  Supposing firms share rents in the form of better health outcomes, 
trade liberalization will improve working conditions at large firms where profits rise and 
deteriorate conditions at smaller firms that are not exporting and face more competition 
on the domestic market.  We take away the conclusion that, in the long-run, the effect of 
import competition on injuries is also heterogeneous across firms: safety standards 
                                                 
18 See Syverson (2010) for a review of empirical studies on intra-firm productivity gains following trade 
liberalizations.   
19 Their model differs from ours in that the adjustment in their model is driven by workers who exert more 
effort to reduce the probability of job loss when unemployment increases as job loss is more costly.  To the 
extent that import competition similarly deteriorates the value of being currently unemployed for a 
manufacturing worker – who might remain unemployed for longer or be forced to switch to a lower-wage 
occupation (as found in Ebenstein et al., 2014) – workers may increase their effort and be willing to accept 
worse safety outcomes following import competition.   
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deteriorate at low-productivity firms if rents fall as a result of import competition.  
Because we do not know how long it takes for long-run effects to materialize, our model 
complements these mechanisms to provide intuition for how imports affect injuries in the 
short run as firms adjust between long-run equilibria. 
Our empirical exercise is most closely related to recent work by Autor et al. 
(2013), Pierce and Schott (2013) and Hummels et al. (2014).  Our finding that greater 
import competition leads to higher injury rates in competing industries provides evidence 
of non-monetary welfare effects of import competition and supplements the results on 
adverse wage and employment effects.   
Hummels et al. present theory that additional hours worked due to greater export 
opportunities leads to an increase in total injuries, consistent with literature on health and 
safety.  They find empirical support for this scaling effect using Danish firm-level data.  
In contrast, our theory explains that firms facing import competition trade off safety for 
productivity and this affects injury rates.  This implies that total injuries may increase 
even if number of workers and number of hours remain fixed.  Therefore, we estimate the 
effect of import competition on injury rates and not the number of injuries.       
We also contribute to the literature on the interrelation between international trade 
and labor standards (see Brown, Deardorff and Stern, 1996; Brown, 2007). Most studies 
focus on the developing world.20 Our theory and evidence shows that occupational safety 
is an important determinant of welfare in developed economies in the face of import 
competition.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we develop a 
theoretical model relating worker injury rates to firm survival; we describe our empirical 
strategy, data, and measurement in Section 3; Section 4 presents our primary empirical 
results; we discuss the robustness of our findings and alternative explanations in Section 
5; Section 6 concludes.  Tables and figures are provided in Appendix B.1. 
2.2 Theoretical Model 
With their backs against the wall, firms facing import competition and struggling for 
survival increase productivity and prolong their existence.  Our theory shows that firms 
can improve productivity at the expense of their workers’ health and safety.  The partial 
equilibrium model provides intuition for what happens during the adjustment process at 
the most affected firms.  These effects of import competition on injuries are absent in 
existing general equilibrium models that compare before and after liberalization steady 
state equilibria.     
                                                 
20 In addition to wealth effects, long-run improvements in OSH can also be attributable to an increase in the 
relative price of labor and technological progress, both in production technology that alters workers 
exposure to risk and in safety technology. (Ruser and Butler, 2009)  Trade exposure may accordingly affect 
standards also through technology diffusion/spillovers from exporters and changes in factor prices, but 
neither channel seems a strong explanation of the effects among US workers studied here. 
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2.2.1 Accidents and Injury Costs 
Workers at the firm face a risk each period of being hurt on the job.  Firms bear long-run 
costs for their workers’ occupational injuries, including workers’ compensation 
payments, medical expenses, fines, and associated legal fees.  Firms shielded by workers’ 
compensation insurance still face higher premiums if their plans are experience-rated.  
Firms further incur indirect costs that are more substantial than the direct costs and are 
not covered by insurance, including costly disruptions in production, damage to capital, 
hiring and training costs for replacement workers, demand penalties from bad publicity, 
and productivity losses due to lower employee morale21 or employing a debilitated 
worker or inexperienced replacement.  Therefore, an injury today results in costs today 
and the future.  We assume that injury costs depreciate exponentially over time at a rate 
of ݀ such that injury costs in period ݐ are ܿሺݐሻ ൌ ܿ݀௧.     
Let ߜ be the exogenous shut-down probability in each period.  The expected total 
cost of an injury today is then  Eሾܥሿ ൌ ׬ ݁ିఋ௧݁ି௥௧ܿሺݐሻ݀ݐஶ௧ୀ଴ , where ݎ is the firm’s 
discount rate.  It follows that, in expectation, the total cost over the firm’s lifetime of an 
accident today is Eሾܥሿ ൌ ௖ሺఋା௥ሻௗ.22   
The firm’s decision maker is in effect “judgment proof”.  Future costs are only 
incurred if the firm is still operates.23  An increase in the shutdown rate ߜ lowers the 
expected future cost of an injury today because the firm is less likely to be active and 
responsible for the cost. 
2.2.2 Technology, Safety and Accident Rates 
Plants employ labor ܮ and elicit worker effort ݁ to produce output ݍ ൌ ߮݁ܮ, given 
exogenous productivity ߮.   
Taking wages ݓ as given, the firm expends resources ݉ to motivate worker 
effort, ݁ሺݓ,݉ሻ ൌ ݉ఈݓఉ, where 0 ൏ ܽ, ߚ ൏ 1.  There is a tradeoff.  The firm’s endowed 
resources, such as management time, are limited and must be split between motivating 
effort and monitoring safety, ݏ.  To simplify notation let ݉ ൅ ݏ ൌ 1.  The cost of 
increasing effort at the expense of safety then comes in the form of a higher injury 
probability ܲሺݏሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݏሻఊ, where ݏ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ (i.e. ݏ and ݉ are both nonnegative) 
                                                 
21 In the fair-wage literature, worker effort depends on how they are treated by the firm in the form of the 
wages they are paid.  Analogously, worker effort might depend on how they are treated by the firm with 
regards to the workplace environment and safety.   
22 This is derived in the following manner: Let ܥ௧ be the cost of an injury as of time ݐ for all future time 
periods.  For a short interval of ߬ periods, ܥ௧ ൌ ߬ܿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݎ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߜ߬ሻܥ௧ାଵ.  As ܥ௧ାଵ ൌ ݀ܥ௧, we have 
ܥ௧ ൌ ఛ௖ଵିሺଵି௥ఛሻሺଵିఋఛሻௗ.  Taking the limit as ߬ → 0 yields ܥ௧ ൌ
௖
ሺఋା௥ሻௗ.  Alternatively, specifying discrete 
periods such that ܧሾܥሿ ൌ ∑ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ௧ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻି௧ܿሺݐሻஶ௧ୀ଴  yields ܥ௧ ൌ ௖ሺଵା௥ሻଵା௥ିௗሺଵିఋሻ and the similar prediction 
డாሾ஼ሿ
డఋ ൏ 0.  
23 In practice, this is implicitly true for many indirect costs – e.g. higher insurance premiums are 
inconsequential if the firm shuts down.  For direct costs, incorporation laws limit many decision-makers 
from financial liability following a shutdown. 
44 
 
guarantees that the probability is bounded by 0 and 1.  Let  ߛ ൒ 1 such that the marginal 
returns to safety are decreasing.   
Now write ܲሺ݉ሻ ൌ ሺ݉ሻఊ for ݉ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. Monitoring ݉ ൌ 1 െ ݏ is the share of 
resources a firm allocates to motivating effort.  Therefore a firm that motivates more 
effort improves the productivity per worker ߮݁, but raises the expected number of worker 
injuries ݉ఊܮ.    
2.2.3 Equilibrium Effort and Safety  
The firm faces the inverse demand curve ݌ெሺݍெሻ ൌ ߠݍெ
ିభ഑, where ߠ ൐ 0 is a demand 
shifter (e.g. price index) and	ߪ ൌ ଵଵିఘ ൐ 1 is the constant elasticity of demand.  The firm 
maximizes total expected profits taking into account future expected costs of injuries.  
The firm chooses ܮ and ݉ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ to maximize profits taking into account total 
discounted injury costs, ߨ ൌ ߠ߮ఘ൫݉ఈݓఉܮ൯ఘ െ ݓܮ െ݉ఊܮ ௖ሺఋା௥ሻௗ.    
Normalizing wages to one24 25, the firm’s optimal share of resources to motivating 
effort is then  ݉∗ ൌ ቂቀ ఈఊିఈቁ ቀ
ௗሺఋା௥ሻ
௖ ቁቃ
భ	
ം , where an interior solution requires ௖ௗሺఋା௥ሻ ൒
ఈ
ఊିఈ .  
The equilibrium worker injury rate is then   
 
 (1)  ܲሺ݉∗ሻ ൌ ቀ ఈఊିఈቁ ቀ
ௗሺఋା௥ሻ
௖ ቁ 
 
Notably, worker effort and injury rates under this specification are independent of the 
demand shifter ߠ and firm productivity ߮; these come through as scaling effects in labor 
only.26 Demand shocks, including changes in the price index, affect injuries only through 
their role in determining the shutdown rate	ߜ.  These solutions lead to the following 
proposition:27  
 
                                                 
24 A few examples of considerable empirical support for wage stickiness are Blinder and Choi (1990), 
Campbell and Kamlani (1997), and recently Barattieri et al. (2014). 
25 We focus our attention on health and so we simplify the model by assuming that wages are unaffected by 
injury risk in the short run, either because workers have asymmetric information and do not observe 
changes in risk or because workers are paid their compensating variation in the event of an injury (this cost 
being subsumed in ܿ) and they are therefore indifferent.  The model’s predictions are consistent under an 
alternative specification that allows for compensating wage differentials so long as other costs of injuries 
exist in the manner prescribed. 
26 The firm’s optimal employment is ܮ∗ ൌ ቈߩߠ߮ఘ ቀ ఈఊିఈቁ
ഀഐ
ം ቀఊିఈఊ ቁ ቀ
ௗሺఋା௥ሻ
௖ ቁ
ഀഐ
ം ቉
భ
భషഐ
.   
27 We use the functional specifications and closed-form solutions introduced above to present our results, 
but the predictions hold for general form functions such that ݁ and ܲ are both increasing and concave in ݉ 
and ܥ is decreasing in ߜ.  These results are available on request.   
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Proposition 1:  At an interior solution, an increase in the shutdown rate ߜ leads firms to 
reduce workplace safety in exchange for greater worker effort and accept an increase in 
the injury rate.  
 
The intuition is straight forward.  An increase in the shutdown rate lowers the expected 
future costs of an injury and the firm responds by pushing workers harder at the expense 
of higher injury rates.   
Note that as the firm increases focus on effort as a result of a decrease in the 
survival probability, the labor productivity ߮݁	increases.  This implies that estimated 
productivity parameters capture a tradeoff between safety and effort.  This is a testable 
hypothesis given appropriate firm level data.    
 
2.3 Empirical Strategy 
In this section we describe our microdata on worker injuries and derive an empirical 
model based on our theory.  We then combine our empirical model with existing 
measures of import competition and discuss the identification strategy.   
2.3.1 Data 
We employ plant-level data from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration on 
worker injuries and illnesses at US manufacturers during 1996-2007. Each year, OSHA 
and participating state regulators sample approximately 50,000 manufacturing 
establishments, or plants, from the universe of private sector plants with at least 40 
employees per BLS records (GAO 2009).28 The data are an unbalanced panel of 473,014 
plant-year observations that covers 53% of all US manufacturing workers during this 
time.   
Each plant self-reports the total number of job-related injury and illness cases 
recorded in the year, the number of cases that required time away or restricted work or 
transfer to other duties, its primary industry at the SIC4 level, the average number of all 
workers during the year, and a measure of equivalent full-time employment for the year 
imputed from total hours worked.  We construct the injury rate ܲ as the OSHA-defined 
Total Case Rate (TCR).  For each establishment, TCR is computed as the number of 
reported injuries in the year divided by the imputed measure of employment, scaled up by 
100.  An increase in TCR therefore measures an increase in the rate of injuries 
normalized to 100 workers.29  Potential reporting errors in both hours worked and 
recorded injuries contribute to mis-measurement of TCR.30   We drop outliers with an 
                                                 
28 Per the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, less than 0.1% of manufacturing plants in the US 
are government-owned and employ less than 0.5% of all manufacturing workers. 
29 It is calculated with the imputed employment measure so that ܲ is a measure of injury risk per unit of 
time worked, and therefore it is not directly affected by lengthening or shortening work schedules.   
30 We also drop the eight observations with employment above 25000 as apparent reporting errors – none 
report employment above 10000 in any preceding or following year.  Our results are robust to their 
inclusion. 
46 
 
imputed TCR greater than 60, twice the highest industry average and eight times the 
overall average.  The correlation coefficient between average industry-year TCRs 
constructed with our sample and the population estimates reported by the BLS is 0.812 
when these 0.5% of observations are excluded and 0.086 when they are not.  The results 
are qualitatively similar when we include these outliers and most remain statistically 
significant.31 Summary statistics for these data are given in Panel A of Table B.1.  More 
detailed information on the data is provided in Appendix B.2.  
To measure import competition we use trade data from two sources.  First, we use 
data on yearly imports from China at the SIC4 industry level provided by Autor et al. 
(2013) and described in detail there.32  Briefly, they concord product-level import data 
from the UN Comtrade Database to the industries that manufacture like products.  We 
make use of their data on Chinese exports to the US and to an aggregate of eight other 
high-income nations.33   
For our policy experiment based on Pierce and Schott (2013) we employ US tariff 
data from Feenstra et al. (2002).34  These data have both the Normal Trade Relations 
(NTR) tariff rates and the higher Column 2 tariff rates for eight-digit Harmonized Tariff 
System products.  Following Pierce and Schott, we define the difference in the two rates 
as the NTR gap and construct a SIC4 industry-level measure by averaging the tariff 
differentials for all goods produced by the industry.35 The mean NTR gap for our sample 
is about 0.31 and the standard deviation is 0.16.  Summary statistics for the trade data are 
provided in Panel B of Table B.1. 
2.3.2 Specification 
Let ݅ denote plants, ݆ denote industries, and ݐ denote years.  Our reduced form model, 
derived in Appendix B.3 from equation (1), relates changes in injury rates over ݏ-years to 
the change in import competition during the period, base-year employment, and industry 
and year-specific effects:  
 
(2)   ln൫ ௜ܲ௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൅ ߚଶ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൈ ln ܮ௜௝௧ 	൅ ߚଷ ln൫ܮ௜௝௧൯ 
                                                 
31 For example, we estimate the mean import shock over five years increased injury rates by 12 ppts at the 
smallest decile of plants (p<0.05) and by 9 ppts at the median (p<0.05) when using the full sample, as 
compared to 13 ppts (p<0.01) and 10 ppts (p<0.05) when using our main (trimmed) sample.  These results 
are available upon request. 
32 This bilateral industry-level trade data is publicly provided on David Dorn’s website, for which we are 
grateful. 
33 They are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. 
34 We are grateful to Feenstra et al. (2002) for making the US tariff data publicly available through John 
Romalis’ website. 
35 We use the matching procedure in Pierce and Schott (2012) to concord HTS8 product tariffs to SIC4 
industries.  We are grateful to them for making their concordance available through Peter Schott’s website. 
We first use the concordance from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and match 63% of products.  Next, we 
concord an HTS8 product to a SIC4 if all other products in its seven-digit “family” match to the same 
SIC4.  We repeat the process using six-digit families and so forth, and this matches an additional 29% of 
products.  Last, in the ordered set of HTS8 codes, we assign a product to a SIC4 if the industry preceding 
the gap is the same as the industry following the gap, which matches an additional 3% of products.   
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൅ ௝߬ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧, 
 
where the change in import competition is identified as the log growth in US imports 
from China in industry ݆, ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦.  The coefficients of interest ߚଵ and ߚଶ capture 
the elasticities of the shutdown rate with respect to import competition and import 
competition interacted with plant employment, our proxy for productivity differences.  
Employment in the base year is assumed to be exogenous of the ensuing growth in import 
competition.  
Existing literature and our theory explain the intuition for the model.  Import 
competition raises shut-down rates (Bernard et al. 2006a; Pierce and Schott, 2013), 
especially at the least productive plants (Bernard et al. 2006b) with low levels of 
employment.  Therefore, based on our theory, we expect	ߚଵ ൐ 0, ߚଶ ൏ 0,	and, ߚଵ ൅
ߚଶ ln൫ܮ௜௝௧൯ ൐ 0. An increase in import competition raises shut-down rates and thus 
increases injury rates, especially at small firms that are most affected by import 
competition. 
Measuring import competition using the growth in Chinese imports by industry 
provides rich identifying variation across industries and time, but this measure is 
correlated with demand shocks.  The coefficient estimates from an OLS regression of 
equation (2) will be biased if demand shocks also affect injury rates, and there are reasons 
to believe they do.  Our theory explains that a demand shock will decrease injury rates if 
it improves the firm’s survival prospects, while Hummels et al. (2015) shows that a 
demand shock will increase total injuries by making output more valuable.  Elsewhere, 
studies link worker injuries to the business cycle, with similarly mixed findings on the 
direction of the effects.36  To control for this potential bias, we employ an instrumental 
variables strategy to exogenously identify import growth driven by supply shocks.  
Notably, the OLS estimates for ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ lnሺܮሻ in equation (2) are generally smaller than 
the IV estimates, suggesting the endogeneity would bias against our results.   
Following Autor et al (2013), we instrument for Chinese import growth in the US 
with Chinese import growth in a set of other OECD countries and estimate equation (2) 
using two-stage least squares (2SLS).  In the first stage, we regress the two endogenous 
variables Δ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ and Δ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൈ ln൫ܮ௜௝௧൯ on the instruments 
Δ ln൫ܯ௢௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ and Δ ln൫ܯ௢௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൈ ln൫ܮ௜௝௧൯, along with base-year employment and 
any fixed effects included in equation (2), using OLS.      
2.3.3 Identification  
The main identifying assumption for the IVs is that the correlated growth across the 
markets is driven by changes in trade costs and China’s productivity.  Under these 
                                                 
36 For example, Ruhm (2000) finds evidence that worker injuries are pro-cyclical, while Brooker et al. 
(1997) and Boone et al. (2011) find the opposite.  
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assumptions, the estimates for ߚଵ and ߚଶ from 2SLS on equation (2) are consistently 
identified.  
We estimate the model in differences and include a rigorous set of fixed effects to 
ensure that no systematic information is moved into the error term that is correlated with 
our instrumental variables or results in endogeneity concerns for the variables that we 
treat as exogenous in our model.   Differencing accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in 
plant characteristics that potentially affect injury rates, such as injury costs and 
productivity.   Industry and base-year fixed effects allow for industry-specific trends in 
injury rates across the full panel and for shocks that affect all establishments in a given 
period.   
We estimate the model for ݏ ൌ ሾ1,6ሿ. We regard five-year differences as our 
preferred specification, consistent with related work (e.g. Bloom et al., 2012; Amiti and 
Davis, 2011; Bernard et al., 2006a, 2006b), but we compare the estimates across intervals 
to speak to how these effects evolve over time.  For the shortest intervals, the instruments 
will be weakened to the degree supply shocks are asynchronous across high income 
countries.  The instrument for longer differences is more forgiving of smaller delays in 
the shocks across markets, but we are left with fewer observations, due to both the 
longitudinal limits of the panel and the increasing likelihood of plants shutting down or 
switching primary industries over longer time horizons.    
Autor et al. list three threats to the IV validity that are also relevant for our 
analysis.  One concern is that product demand shocks may be correlated across the US 
and other high-income countries, and therefore the first-stage IV results are not capturing 
the supply-side effect only.  To check this, they apply a gravity strategy that isolates the 
import growth attributable to changes in trade costs and China’s productivity.  They find 
similar results and conclude that correlated demand shocks are not driving their estimates 
for employment and wage effects using the IV.  We proceed with the same assumption 
for our identification of injury effects.  Second, the correlation may be driven by adverse 
productivity shocks to US producers that are being supplanted by Chinese imports in US 
and other OECD markets, but China’s explosive productivity growth – about 8% over 
this period (Brandt et al., 2012), more than double that in the US – make it the more 
likely driver of its export growth across the markets.  Lastly, Chinese imports may rise in 
both the US and other OECD countries following common technology shocks that 
adversely affect labor-intensive industries.  However, Chinese export growth to the US 
greatly outpaced that of other low and middle-income nations which may similarly 
exploit an adverse shock, suggesting that Chinese productivity shocks and falling trade 
costs for Chinese imports instead drove the growth.   
To alleviate remaining endogeneity concerns associated with the instrumental 
variable technique outlined above, we also employ an alternative identification strategy 
based on a natural policy experiment.  The US permanently reduced import tariffs on 
Chinese goods in 2001 when it acceded to the WTO.  Following Pierce and Schott 
(2013), we use the industry-specific tariff reductions to proxy for the changes in import 
competition associated with the policy shock, and we identify the effects on injuries using 
a difference-in-difference estimator.  
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The second identification concern we consider is potential measurement error in 
the dependent variable.  If the measurement error is not random in our estimating 
equations, it will bias our coefficient estimates.  For example, it may be the case that 
workers at dying plants are more like to report injuries. In that case, part of  ߚଶ captures 
misreporting.  It is not clear that this is true, however. Even at dying plants, workers want 
to preserve a good reputation as they likely have to hunt for new jobs in the future.  
Nevertheless we will perform a robustness check using the rate of fatalities and more 
serious nonfatal injuries and illnesses only – those that required time away from work, 
restricted work or transfer – under the premise that these incidences cannot be as easily 
hidden and are less susceptible to strategic misreporting.   
Third, a key connection between our empirical specification and theory is the 
interaction of import competition with plant size.  We assume plant size proxies for 
differences in productivity, which we do not observe in the data.  This assumption is 
consistent with our theory and with new trade models such as Melitz (2003), where the 
least productive firms are the smallest. Notably, using labor as a proxy is advantageous 
for regulators and policymakers who are looking to identify the plants most affected by 
import competition: plant size is directly observed and more widely available than is data 
on plant-level total factor productivity.  Findings in Holmes and Stevens (2014) suggest 
an alternative explanation.  They show that the very smallest firms and firms closely 
located to metropolitan areas are more specialized and are therefore shielded from import 
competition.  We will perform several robustness checks that show that this is not 
affecting our results.   
Next, our identification is potentially biased because the yearly samples only 
target plants with 40 or more workers.  Our sample of differences is therefore biased 
towards excluding plants that shrank during the period as some become ineligible for 
selection.  Optimally, we would observe a balanced sample of all surviving plants, but 
that’s not possible with our data source. This threatens our identification if the injury 
effects of import competition are different at growing plants such that our estimates are 
not representative of the full population.  Further, this explains heterogeneity in the 
estimates as the selection bias is greatest for smaller plants already near the margin.  Our 
theory suggests that this will bias our estimates towards zero if plants that grow tend to be 
those less affected by import competition, but we still address the issue with robustness 
checks that limit the sample to larger plants in the base year that are unlikely to be 
excluded with moderate falls in employment.    
Finally, we consider the potential bias in our main specification arising from 
heterogeneity in establishment discount rates.  This will bias our estimates towards zero.  
The intuition is that plants with high discount rates already place a low value on the 
future and changes in shut-down rates are less relevant.  Notably, this bias would seem to 
work against our predictions that the effects are greatest at small plants given evidence in 
the literature that they are the more fiscally constrained and have higher discount rates 
(Beck et al., 2005).  Nevertheless, we show in Appendix B.3 that specifying the model in 
levels allows us to separate discount rates from shutdown rates such that they difference 
out.  Therefore as an alternative specification we estimate  
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(3)   ௜ܲ௝௧:௧ା௦ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൅ ߚଶ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൈ ln ܮ௜௝௧ 	൅ ߚଷ ln൫ܮ௜௝௧൯ 
 
൅ߠ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧. 
 
Estimating this model in levels has the advantage that we can include zero injury 
observations which we have to drop in the log-linear model.  The trade-off is that, as we 
show in the appendix, in this case the estimates are affected by heterogeneity in plant-
specific injury costs.  Therefore, we prefer model (2) over model (3) because according to 
our theory we can account for plant specific injury costs.   
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Baseline Specification 
Table B.2 reports our main results for the effect of Chinese import shocks on 
injury rates at competing US manufacturers.  The six columns give the second-stage 
estimates from the 2SLS regression of equation (2) for one- to six-year differences.  The 
IVs fail a weak instrument test in the first-stage regressions for one-year differences, but 
are significantly correlated for all longer intervals.37  For all intervals, we find that 
Chinese import shocks increased injury rates at the smallest US plants in the industry 
(ߚଵ ൐ 0), and the effects were decreasing across plants in size (ߚଶ ൏ 0).  Under the 
identifying assumptions for our 2SLS strategy, these effects are the result of Chinese 
productivity gains and falling trade costs.  The estimates for both coefficients of interest 
are statistically significant for all specifications save that for one-year differences.   
We estimate the marginal effect ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ൈ ln	ሺܮሻ at approximately the smallest 
decile (ܮ ൌ40), median (ܮ ൌ100), and largest decile (ܮ ൌ400) of plant employment size 
in the sample. These estimates are reported in Table B.2 for each difference specification.  
For five-year differences, we estimate that the elasticity of injury growth with respect to 
import shocks is about 0.107 at the smallest decile of plants (p<0.01) and 0.085 at the 
median (p<0.05).  The effects are positive and significant at plants with less than 250 
employees and weakly positive at all but the very largest plants in the sample.  
These estimates imply that moving an industry from the first to third quartile of 
total Chinese import growth over five years increases injury rates by about 12 percentage 
points at the smallest decile of plants and 10 percentage points at the median. 
Alternatively, scaling the estimates by the interquartile range for the distribution of 
supply-driven import growth yields magnitudes half these sizes, based on estimates in 
Autor et al. (2013) that show supply shocks comprise 48% of total growth. 
                                                 
37 For differences of two or more years, the robust F statistics for joint significance of the instruments 
considerably exceed 10, the benchmark for weak instruments suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).  That 
the F statistics for one-year differences fall below this value suggests the instruments in that specification 
are weak and the second-stage estimates may be inconsistent as a result.  The test statistics for weak 
instruments are suppressed in Tables 5 and 8 as they are quite similar to those reported in Table 2 (the first 
stage equations are the same).       
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Looking across time intervals, we find that the estimated elasticities at the 
smallest decile of plants are small and statistically insignificant for two to three year 
intervals and become larger and significant after four to five years and appear to plateau 
there.38  The estimates for the median plants follow a similar trend, while those for the 
very largest plants are not significantly different from zero for any specification. The 
results demonstrate that, at smaller plants in affected industries, the injury effects of 
import competition are persistent over four to six years.  
2.4.2 Magnitudes 
Our estimates show that Chinese import shocks worsen injury rates at smaller plants in 
competing US industries.  We use a back-of-the-envelope exercise to derive estimates for 
the magnitude of these effects, recognizing that they are only part of the story.  Other 
channels like trade-induced labor reallocations and industry and local labor market 
spillovers likely contribute to the general equilibrium effect but lie beyond our analysis.  
Nonetheless, our estimates give an idea of the scale of these non-wage effects and their 
relative importance for worker welfare, providing a point of comparison with existing 
studies on the wage effects of trade.   
 We derive these estimates using the 5-year difference model to predict log growth 
in plant injury rates under both the realized growth in Chinese imports and the 
counterfactual of no import growth over the period, holding the other parameters of the 
model constant. From the employment-weighted average of the estimates, we back out 
the predicted yearly injury rates for all US manufacturing workers under the two 
scenarios.39  The difference in a given year, scaled by US manufacturing employment, 
gives our estimate for the number of injuries attributable to Chinese import competition 
through these within-plant effects.   
These back-of-the-envelope estimates are presented in Table B.3.  Our estimates 
attribute 7.4% of all US manufacturing worker injuries and illnesses to Chinese import 
shocks, which increased annual morbidity by 0.51 cases per 100 workers on average. 
Figure B.1 shows the predicted injury rates for 2007 across plant size bins and illustrates 
the heterogeneity in these effects.  The increased morbidity at plants with 50 or fewer 
workers was 0.98 cases per 100 workers (13% increase), while at plants with 1000 or 
more workers it was only 0.12 (2% increase).  In aggregate, import shocks were 
responsible for between 62,000 and 90,000 injuries, where the lower bound assumes 
injury rates were unchanged at the small plants that lie outside our sample and the upper 
bound applies estimates for the smallest plants in our sample to out-of-sample plants. 
The value of statistical life literature estimates that nonfatal occupational injury 
and illness cost worker welfare between $35,000 and $100,000 in 2004 USD (Viscusi, 
                                                 
38 It seems unlikely that the trends across time intervals are driven by changes in the composition of the 
estimating sample related to plants dropping out.  The results look similar when limiting the estimating 
sample for each specification to only plants that survive at least five years past the base year (the criterion 
for inclusion in the five-year difference sample).  These results are available upon request.   
39 In aggregating, we first create an industry average using establishment-level effects and weighting each 
by plant employment, reported in the ODI data, and then we aggregate across industries and weight each by 
the manufacturing employment shares reported by the BLS.   
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1993; Hersch, 1998; Leeth and Ruser. 2003).40  Based on those values, the estimated 
within-plant injury effects of Chinese imports cost US manufacturing workers the 
equivalent of a 0.4%-1.6% reduction in wages and between $2.2 billion and $9 billion in 
aggregate each year.41 This is in addition to direct and indirect costs borne by firms and 
the government. 
2.4.3 Identifying Import Shocks Using Natural Policy Experiment  
The main threat to identification is that we are not exogenously identifying supply shocks 
with our IV and our results are instead driven by unobserved factors related to both the 
import measure and the number of injuries, such as demand shocks.  We address this 
concern by testing the model’s predictions using a second strategy for identifying import 
competition based on the policy experiment applied by Pierce and Schott (2013).  The 
measure is grounded in trade policy and relies on a different set of exogeneity 
assumptions.  
The US granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in 2001 when 
it acceded to the WTO.  Previously, the US had granted Chinese imports the lower NTR 
tariff rates annually based on a vote of Congress, and the votes were often heavily 
contested.42  The policy change eliminated uncertainty over future trade costs and 
encouraged Chinese firms to incur the fixed cost to export to the US: Handley and Limão 
(2013) finds that the reduction in tariff uncertainty explains 22-30% of Chinese exports 
following its joining the WTO.  The ensuing import growth is especially large for 
products where the difference in the NTR and non-NTR tariffs is large, and so the shock 
hits some industries harder than others based on the import tariffs protecting their 
products.  
Following Pierce and Schott, we use the NTR gap for each industry – the average 
difference in the two tariff rates for its goods – to quantify the import shock that hit each 
manufacturing industry in 2001.  We use the following difference-in-difference (DiD) 
estimator to compare within-plant changes in injury rates before and after PNTR in 2001 
(first difference) and across industries with higher and lower NTR gaps (second 
difference): 
 
(4) ln൫ ௜ܲ௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ߬௝̅ ൈ 1௧ஹଶ଴଴ଵ ൅ ߚଶ߬௝̅ ൈ 1௧ஹଶ଴଴ଵ ൈ ln൫ܮ௜௝௧൯ ൅ ߛ ln൫ܮ௜௝௧൯ 
 
                                                 
40 These values do not account for the documented heterogeneity in VSL related to worker income, age, 
gender, and other characteristics (Evans and Smith, 2006, 2010; Knieser et al., 2010).  We do not observe 
these in the data.  The total welfare effects will differ if these injuries are disproportionately concentrated 
among some groups. 
41 These estimates exclude fatalities, which we do not identify.  Supposing import competition explained 
7% of the 392 worker fatalities in the US manufacturing industry (Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries) 
would imply an additional $190 million in welfare loss based on a benchmark VSL estimates of $7 million 
(Kniesner et al., 2010).  
42 The House of Representatives voted against temporary NTR status for China in 1990, 1991 and 1992, 
following the Tiananmen Square incident, but the Senate failed to act on those votes and the status was 
granted in each year. 
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൅ߠ௧ ൅ ߠ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧ 
 
where ߬௝̅ is the (time invariant) NTR gap for industry ݆. We separately estimate the model 
for changes over ݏ ൌ ሾ1,5ሿ years using for each the sample of observed changes on either 
side of PNTR,	ݐ ൌ ሼ2001 െ ݏ, 2001ሽ.  Industry fixed effects ߠ௝ account for industry-
specific trends in injury rates that span both pre- and post-PNTR periods, and base-year 
fixed effects ߠ௧ control for the common trend across industries within each time period.  
The results for equation (4) are given in Table B.4.  We find that permanently reducing 
Chinese import tariffs significantly affected injury rates at competing US manufacturers.  
The results support our main findings: the import shock increases injury rates at the 
smallest plants in the industry (ߚଵ ൐ 0) and the effects are diminishing in plant size 
(ߚଶ ൏ 0).  The coefficient estimates are statistically significant for intervals of three or 
more years.  We calculate the marginal effect of the NTR Gap on injury rate growth at 
the smallest decile, median, and largest decile of plant employment and report those 
estimates for each specification in Table B.4.  The trend and the timing are consistent 
with outside evidence on labor adjustments following a trade shock.  Pierce and Schott 
(2013) estimate that liberalizing US tariffs on Chinese goods in 2001 caused a cumulative 
decline in US manufacturing employment growth over the following ݏ ൌ ሾ1,6ሿ years of 
(in percentage points): 3, 6, 11, 13, 15, 16.   
For interpretation, we scale the marginal effects by the mean NTR gap for the 
sample, about 0.28.  In the mean-affected industry, we estimate that the liberalization 
increases injury rates over the five years that follow by 5.8 percentage points at the 
smallest decile of plants (p<0.01).  The effect was weakly positive at the median plant 
and weakly negative at the largest decile.  These results provide direct evidence of 
changes in tariff policy affecting worker health at competing domestic plants, and are, to 
our knowledge, the first results to do so.   
Several identification concerns related to these estimates are worth discussing.  
Our main identifying assumption here is that the NTR gap is exogenous to market 
conditions near PNTR in 2001 that may also correlate with injury rates.  This assumption 
is grounded in the fact that the tariff rates were set long before this period and there were 
few changes in the decade leading up to PNTR and none to non-NTR rates, which 
explain 89% of the variation in the measure.  In further support, Pierce and Schott show 
that their results are robust to using lagged tariff rates to construct the NTR gap.  We 
follow their main specification and use 1999 tariff rates.   
A related threat to identification arises because PNTR coincides with the business 
cycle peak in 2001.  Pierce and Schott deal with the issue by comparing post-2001 
changes to those that followed the previous peak in 1990, but we cannot do this because 
our data does not begin until 1996.  It seems unlikely that our results are biased by 
correlation between the NTR gap and the injury effects of the business cycle across 
industries for a few reasons. First, industry NTR gaps are plausibly exogenous to changes 
in the macroeconomy during this period for reasons discussed above.  Second, the 
literature finds that reported injury rates are procyclical, so any bias would seem to work 
against our finding an increase in injury rates following PNTR.  Further, it is not evident 
that this bias explains intra-industry heterogeneity across plants.   
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As compared to our import growth measure, we have less intertemporal variation 
when identifying the model using the NTR gap.  It only explains within-industry changes 
in injury growth before and after PNTR in 2001, and not changes within either period 
(e.g. 1996:1998 vs. 1998:2000) or in periods spanning the change (e.g. 1999:2003), 
which limits our estimating sample.  Identification with the NTR gap holds appeal in that 
it directly links trade policy to worker health effects.   
2.4.4 Robustness  
We run robustness checks to address several remaining threats to identification in 
our main empirical results.  Out of concern for potential bias in our primary dependent 
variable due to misreporting, we estimate equation (2) using the rate of fatal and serious 
nonfatal injuries and illnesses only.    These injuries are more difficult to hide and less 
susceptible to strategic reporting by workers, and therefore the results are more robust to 
this potential bias in the left-hand variable of the equations.  The results, shown in Table 
B.5, are consistent with those from our main specification.  We conclude that import 
competition affects worker injuries and not reporting behavior only. 
We next address our identifying assumption that size captures productivity 
differences across plants in an industry.  This assumption connects our heterogeneous 
empirical specification to the theory and underpins our interpretation of the regression 
results.  Holmes and Stevens (2014) provide an alternative explanation for why import 
competition affects small plants differently: producers of specialty and custom goods are 
likely smaller and better insulated from Chinese import competition.  For our empirical 
results, this suggests that differential effects among these specialized plants might be 
driving the heterogeneity across plant size.   
Holmes and Stevens discuss plants with less than 20 employees, which suggests 
we are largely shielded from this issue as our sample is intended to cover only plants with 
at least 40. Less than 4% of observations in our data report 20 or fewer employees.  We 
also limit issues relating to heterogeneity within industries by defining them according to 
SIC codes.  Holmes and Stevens point out that the newer North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS) redefines several manufacturing industries in a way that 
increases the presence of custom and specialty plants relative SIC-defined industries.  For 
example, some small custom cabinet-makers are classified in the wood kitchen cabinet 
industry under NAICS, but these are classified as retail under SIC and excluded from our 
sample. 
Still, we run several robustness checks that are presumed to limit the presence of 
specialty plants in the estimating sample based on Holmes and Stevens findings.  These 
results are presented in Table B.6.  In the first column, we exclude plants with less than 
100 workers in the base year.  In the second column, we exclude plants in industries with 
the highest shares of specialty plants based on estimates from Holmes and Stevens.  
Lastly, Holmes and Stevens find that specialty plants tend to be located in urban areas, 
and so we exclude plants in more densely populated five-digit ZIP codes using US 
Gazetteer data and present the results in the third column.  For each check, the results are 
consistent with our main specification.  Importantly, the heterogeneity across plant size 
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persists within each of these subsamples, supporting our claim that it is driven by 
productivity differences and not specialization.43 
The estimates in column 1 of Table B.6 also demonstrate that our results are not 
driven by bias due to the sample not covering plants where employment shrinks below 
the selection minimum.  Less than 2% of plants with at least 100 employees in the base 
year report below 50 employees five years later, suggesting few among this group were 
operating but ineligible for selection because their employment was below 40.  Our 
results using this estimating sample that is more robust to omitting shrinking plants are 
qualitatively similar to our main results.  
We lastly estimate the model using the level-difference specification for injury 
rates given in equation (3).  Presented in Table B.7, the results support our main finding 
that injury rates went up at small plants hit with import competition.  The trends across 
plant size and interval durations generally resemble those in our main results, with the 
exception that the estimated effects at larger plants are positive and statistically 
significant for longer differences in the levels specification.   
2.5 Conclusion 
We find empirical evidence that the growth in Chinese imports in the US in the late 
1990s and early 2000s significantly increased worker injury and illness rates in the 
competing industries in the short to medium run.  We find that one significant contributor 
to these effects was the change in US trade policy in 2001, when import tariffs on 
Chinese goods were permanently reduced. The heterogeneous within-industry effects 
were greatest for small plants.  Back-of-the-envelope estimates show that Chinese import 
shocks accounted for 7.4% of worker injuries and illnesses in US manufacturing during 
2001-2007.  Injury rates rose by 13% at the smallest plants, costing worker welfare the 
equivalent of a 1-2% reduction in annual wages.   
 Our theoretical model predicts that firms respond to greater shutdown risk by 
allocating resources towards productivity at the expense of safety.  Based on the theory, 
we hypothesize that import competition will deteriorate worker health outcomes in the 
short run at marginal firms at risk of being pushed from the market during the transition 
to the new open economy equilibrium.  This mechanism – substituting resources away 
from safety and into productivity – allows firms to prolong their life in the market and 
slow down the adjustment process following a trade liberalization, but does so at the cost 
of its workers’ health.  
Our theory and interpretation of the estimation results is consistent with recent 
evidence from Lazear et al. (2013) that finds increases in worker effort during a recession 
drive firm productivity gains.  In our data we cannot identify changes in effort or other 
                                                 
43 Notably, we find that the 5-year injury effects among plants with 40 or fewer workers are ݈݋ݓ݁ݎ at the 
smallest plants: ߚଵ ൌ	-1.400* and ߚଶ ൌ 0.429**. This is consistent with the story that the very smallest 
plants are specialized and insulated from import competition, but the results should be taken with the caveat 
that we do not observe many of these plants in the data (N=3212) and their reported employment falls 
below the intended minimum for the sample. 
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factors that might affect injury rates, such as changes in technology or shifts towards 
employing more temporary or part-time workers.  Future research matching more 
comprehensive firm level data with detailed worker level data will be able to provide 
further evidence related to the underlying mechanisms for these effects.    
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Appendix B.1 Tables and Figures 
Table B.1. Summary Statistics of US Manufacturing Plant-Level Data, 1996-2007 
PANEL A: Injury and Employment Data (Full Sample) 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Observations per Plant 172188 3.289 2.622 
Years Spanned in Data 172188 4.034 4.088 
Observations/Year Spanned 172188 0.793 0.246 
Employment 526931 185.64 432.36 
Injury Rate (TCR) 473014 10.38 9.50 
Injury Rate (TCR) | Non-zero 420046 11.68 9.30 
Log Injury Rate (TCR) 420046 2.125 0.889 
1-year log-change 192851 -0.124 0.646 
2-year log-change 152186 -0.180 0.715 
3-year log-change 137015 -0.219 0.764 
4-year log-change 117785 -0.281 0.796 
5-year log-change 93509 -0.347 0.816 
6-year log-change 72673 -0.410 0.836 
Severe Injury Rate (DART) 474637 5.475 5.988 
Non-Severe Injury Rate 475549 5.071 6.350 
Notes: Employment imputed from total hours worked as equivalent full-time workers, and excludes 
observations with imputed plant employment of greater than 25000.  Injury rate statistics exclude 
observations with imputed injury rates above 60 per 100 workers in a year. Observation intensity is 
an upper bound as time spanned in data is a lower bound of the spell in eligible pool for selection.  
PANEL B: Import Competition Measures 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
US Imports from China (000s) 560784 760.0 1868.7 
1996 Levels (000s) 59568 235.3 512.3 
2007 Levels (000s) 43965 1587.4 3151.9 
Log US Imports from China 558746 11.06 3.02 
1-year log-change 245123 0.264 0.750 
2-year log-change 199097 0.527 0.990 
3-year log-change 181189 0.803 1.111 
4-year log-change 155399 1.062 1.196 
5-year log-change 123452 1.263 1.297 
6-year log-change 95514 1.558 1.406 
OTH Imports from China (000s) 560558 471.0 978.3 
NTR Gap 164464 0.313 0.161 
Notes: OTH refers to the set of other OECD countries used to instrument for imports in the US, 
following Autor et al. (2013).  The distribution of NTR gap is across plants only as it is time 
invariant, all others are across plant-years.  
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Table B.2. Injury Effects of Realized Chinese Import Growth (Second Stage IV Results) 
Dependent Variable: Log Growth in Injury Rates at Plant ܔܖሺࢀ࡯ࡾሻ࢚:࢚ା࢙ 
Import Competition Measure: Log Growth in Chinese Imports in Industry ܔܖሺࡹ࢛ࢉሻ࢚:࢚ା࢙ 
Interval Duration (࢙) 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 
Import Competition 0.357 (0.234) 
0.192** 
(0.086) 
0.114* 
(0.061) 
0.267*** 
(0.063) 
0.193*** 
(0.064) 
0.164*** 
(0.061) 
ൈ Employment -0.031 (0.024) 
-0.037** 
(0.014) 
-0.023** 
(0.010) 
-0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.024** 
(0.009) 
-0.022** 
(0.010) 
Employment 0.026
*** 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
0.018 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
Estimated Marginal Effects by Plant Employment Size  
40 Employees 0.245 
(0.163) 
0.057 
(0.042) 
0.031 
(0.035) 
0.107*** 
(0.037) 
0.107*** 
(0.039) 
0.083** 
(0.036) 
100 Employees 0.217 
(0.148) 
0.024 
(0.036) 
0.010 
(0.031) 
0.067** 
(0.035) 
0.085** 
(0.035) 
0.063* 
(0.033) 
400 Employees 0.174 
(0.130) 
-0.027 
(0.035) 
-0.021 
(0.031) 
0.007 
(0.031) 
0.052 
(0.033) 
0.033 
(0.033) 
F-Statistics for Joint Significance of Instruments in First-Stage Regressions
ܔܖ൫ࡹ࢛ࢉ,࢐൯࢚:࢚ା࢙  3.88 42.62 70.91 110.55 58.64 58.94 
ܔܖ൫ࡹ࢛ࢉ,࢐൯࢚:࢚ା࢙ ൈ ܔܖ ࡸ࢏࢐࢚  9.51 47.97 90.45 206.19 126.54 135.33 
Base Years (ݐ) 1996-2006 1996-2005 1996-2004 1996-2003 1996-2002 1996-2001 
Number of Plant Clusters 62780 49981 46523 44224 38787 32204 
Observations 185416 142312 126210 107639 84552 64939 
Notes: All regressions include a constant and year and industry (SIC4) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by plant and reported in 
parentheses.  Employment is the natural log of the number of employees in the base year.  Regressions include all plants with observations that span the 
respective interval, including those in states that drop out of the sample in later years and in “catch-all” SIC4 industry categories, xxx9.  Omitting either or 
both groups does not significantly affect the results.  The employment levels 40, 100, and 400 are approximately the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for the 
five-year difference estimating sample.  The distributions for the samples in the other regressions are similar. F-statistics for weak instrument tests are 
adjusted for robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table B.3. Predicted Injury Effects for Import Growth Specification Under Alternative Trade Environments 
 
Manufacturing 
Emp. (000s) 
Sample 
Injury Rate 
Predictions | Realized 
Chinese Import Growth 
Predictions | No  
Chinese Import Growth Difference in Predictions Share Cases 
Attributable 
to Import Growth (ppts) 
Year Injury 
Rate No. Injuries Injury Rate No. Injuries Injury Rate No. Injuries 
2001 16641 6.74 6.51 1083329 6.07 1010109 0.43 73220 6.6 
2002 15259 7.31 7.36 1123062 6.87 1048293 0.49 74769 6.7 
2003 14509 7.41 8.57 1243421 7.90 1146211 0.67 97210 7.8 
2004 14315 6.21 8.62 1233953 7.96 1139474 0.66 94479 7.7 
2005 14227 5.55 6.15 874961 5.75 818053 0.40 56908 6.5 
2006 14155 5.23 5.47 774279 5.03 711997 0.45 62282 8.2 
2007 13879 5.46 5.70 791103 5.22 724484 0.48 66619 8.4 
Mean 14712 6.31 6.92 1017730 6.41 942660 0.51 75070 7.4 
Notes:  Injury rates are calculated as the Total Case Rate (TCR), the number of reported injuries and illnesses in a year per 100 equivalent fulltime workers.  
Estimates are from the specification of equation 2 for five-year intervals. Average rates across years are weighted by yearly manufacturing employment.  
Injury rates are estimated using a data sample restricted to firms with at least 40 employees, but the estimates here are applied to all manufacturing 
employment.  About 17% of manufacturing workers over this period are employed at plants of less than 40 workers, which lie outside our sample.  The 
estimates for the number of injuries should therefore be multiplied by 0.83 to obtain the estimated effects for workers at plants covered by our sample only 
and the number of injuries attributable to Chinese import growth under the assumption that injury rates at out-of-sample plants are unaffected.   
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Table B.4: Injury Effects of Permanent Import Tariff Reductions Granted China in 2001 
Dependent Variable: Log Growth in Injury Rates at Plant ܔܖሺࢀ࡯ࡾሻ࢚:࢚ା࢙ 
Import Competition Measure: Mean Tariff Reduction for Industry’s Goods Permanently Granted China in 2001 ૚(Post-NTR)tൈ NTR-Gap 
 Interval Duration (࢙) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
Import Competition -0.094 (0.141) 
0.148 
(0.165) 
0.414** 
(0.173) 
0.634*** 
(0.179) 
0.705*** 
(0.190) 
ൈ Employment 0.022 (0.026) 
-0.017 
(0.031) 
-0.067** 
(0.032) 
-0.116*** 
(0.034) 
-0.122*** 
(0.036) 
Employment 0.000 (0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.023*** 
(0.008) 
Estimated Marginal Effects by Plant Employment Size 
40 Employees -0.015 
(0.066) 
0.084 
(0.077) 
0.167** 
(0.079) 
0.205** 
(0.082) 
0.255*** 
(0.084) 
100 Employees 0.005 
(0.057) 
0.068 
(0.068) 
0.106 
(0.069) 
0.098 
(0.072) 
0.143 
(0.073) 
400 Employees 0.035 
(0.062) 
0.044 
(0.076) 
0.013 
(0.076) 
-0.063 
(0.080) 
-0.027 
(0.082) 
Base Years (ݐ) 2000,2001 1999,2001 1998,2001 1997,2001 1996,2001 
Number of Plant Clusters 21468 17953 20601 20672 21552 
Observations 31781 25205 27194 26114 27496 
R2 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.018 
Notes: All regressions include a constant and year and industry (SIC4) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by plant and reported in 
parentheses.   Employment is the natural log of the number of employees in the base year.  Regressions include all plants with observations that span the 
respective interval, including those in states that drop out of the sample in later years and in “catch-all” SIC4 industry categories, xxx9.  Omitting either or 
both groups does not significantly affect the results. The employment levels 40, 100, and 400 are approximately the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for the 
five-year difference estimating sample.  The distributions for the samples in the other regressions are similar. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table B.5: Robustness to Misreporting: Severe Injury Effects of Chinese Import Growth (Second Stage IV Results) 
Dependent Variable: Log Growth in Severe Injury Rates at Plant ܔܖሺࡰ࡭ࡾࢀሻ࢚:࢚ା࢙ 
Import Competition Measure: Log Growth in Chinese Imports in Industry ܔܖሺࡹ࢛ࢉሻ࢚:࢚ା࢙ 
 Interval Duration (࢙) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 
Import Competition 0.249 (0.283) 
0.104 
(0.097) 
0.047 
(0.073) 
0.170 ** 
(0.070) 
0.153** 
(0.068) 
0.166** 
(0.071) 
ൈ Employment -0.008 (0.030) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.027*** 
(0.010) 
-0.024** 
(0.010) 
-0.022* 
(0.011) 
Employment 0.033
*** 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.028*** 
(0.010) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.029** 
(0.014) 
-0.039** 
(0.016) 
Estimated Marginal Effects by Plant Employment Size 
40 Employees 0.220 
(0.191) 
0.044 
(0.048) 
0.028 
(0.042) 
0.071* 
(0.043) 
0.065 
(0.041) 
0.084** 
(0.043) 
100 Employees 0.212 
(0.172) 
0.029 
(0.042) 
0.023 
(0.039) 
0.047 
(0.039) 
0.043 
(0.037) 
0.064 
(0.039) 
400 Employees 0.201 
(0.147) 
0.006 
(0.041) 
0.016 
(0.038) 
0.009 
(0.037) 
0.009 
(0.036) 
0.033 
(0.039) 
Base Years (ݐ) 1996-2006 1996-2005 1996-2004 1996-2003 1996-2002 1996-2001 
Number of Plant Clusters 57339 45526 41872 39733 34575 28680 
Observations 170419 130346 113785 96890 75895 58266 
Notes: All regressions include a constant and year and industry (SIC4) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by plant and reported in 
parentheses.  Employment is the natural log of the number of employees in the base year.  Regressions include all plants with observations that span the 
respective interval, including those in states that drop out of the sample in later years and in “catch-all” SIC4 industry categories, xxx9.  The employment 
levels 40, 100, and 400 are approximately the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for the five-year difference estimating sample.  The distributions for the 
samples in the other regressions are similar. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table B.6: Specialization Robustness Checks 
Dependent Variable: 5-Year Log Growth in Injury Rates at Plant ܔܖሺࢀ࡯ࡾሻ࢚:࢚ା૞ 
Import Competition Measure: 5-Year Log Growth in Chinese Imports in Industry ܔܖሺࡹ࢛ࢉሻ࢚:࢚ା૞ 
Dimension of Selection 
(Base-Year Value) Plant Employment ൒100 
Population Density 
(ZIP5) ൑ 75th %ile 
Share Specialized Plants in 
Industry ൑ 75th %ile 
Import Competition 0.248
*** 
(0.088) 
0.207*** 
(0.076) 
0.164*** 
(0.058) 
ൈ Employment -0.031
** 
(0.013) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.021** 
(0.009) 
Employment 0.002 (0.017) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
Estimated Marginal Effects by Plant Employment Size 
40 Employees  0.121*** 
(0.047) 
0.088*** 
(0.033) 
100 Employees 0.106** 
(0.045) 
0.100** 
(0.042) 
0.069** 
(0.029) 
400 Employees 0.064 
(0.040) 
0.067* 
(0.039) 
0.041 
(0.029) 
Base Years (ݐ) 1996-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 
Number of Plant Clusters 22659 29546 28531 
Observations 48975 65684 63063 
Notes: All regressions include a constant and year and industry (SIC4) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by plant and reported in parentheses.   Employment is the natural log of the number of employees in the base 
year.  Results shown are for differences over five years using the supply growth measure of import competition.  The 
results for other intervals and for the tariff gap measure resemble the trends for the main specifications and are 
available on request.  The sample for the third column excludes plants in ZIP codes with population densities above 
2,530 people/sq. mile.  The sample for the fourth column excludes plants in industries (SIC4) with shares of 
specialized firms above 78%, based on estimates from Holmes and Stevens (2014). Sensitivity checks demonstrate the 
results are robust to the respective cutoffs used, and are available on request as well. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table B.7: Levels Specification for Injury Effects of Realized Chinese Import Growth (Second Stage IV Results) 
Dependent Variable: Level Growth in Injury Rates at Plant ሺࡼሻ࢚:࢚ା࢙ 
Import Competition Measure: Log Growth in Chinese Imports in Industry ሺࡹ࢛ࢉሻ࢚:࢚ା࢙ 
 Interval Duration (࢙) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 
Import Competition 4.950
** 
(2.223) 
2.293** 
(1.053) 
1.177 
(0.725) 
3.182*** 
(0.736) 
3.283*** 
(0.786) 
1.968** 
(0.765) 
ൈ Employment -0.606
** 
(0.236) 
-0.383** 
(0.175) 
-0.159 
(0.124) 
-0.399*** 
(0.114) 
-0.332*** 
(0.113) 
-0.169 
(0.124) 
Employment 0.393
*** 
(0.065) 
0.224** 
(0.096) 
-0.008 
(0.105) 
0.260** 
(0.126) 
0.195 
(0.149) 
-0.083 
(0.197) 
Estimated Marginal Effects by Plant Employment Size 
40 Employees 2.713* 
(1.633) 
0.881 
(0.544) 
0.590 
(0.407) 
1.712*** 
(0.430) 
2.057*** 
(0.486) 
1.344*** 
(0.453) 
100 Employees 2.157 
(1.528) 
0.530 
(0.472) 
0.444 
(0.376) 
1.347*** 
(0.389) 
1.752*** 
(0.442) 
1.190*** 
(0.420) 
400 Employees 1.317 
(1.418) 
-0.001 
(0.459) 
0.223 
(0.392) 
0.794** 
(0.375) 
1.292*** 
(0.419) 
0.956** 
(0.425) 
Base Years (ݐ) 1996-2006 1996-2005 1996-2004 1996-2003 1996-2002 1996-2001 
Number of Plant Clusters 70740 56197 52910 49941 43737 36414 
Observations 202096 155358 140036 119008 93507 71854 
Notes: All regressions include a constant and year and industry (SIC4) fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by plant and reported in 
parentheses.  Employment is the natural log of the number of employees in the base year.  Regressions include all plants with observations that span the 
respective interval, including those in states that drop out of the sample in later years and in “catch-all” SIC4 industry categories, xxx9.  Omitting either or 
both groups does not significantly affect the results. The employment levels 40, 100, and 400 are approximately the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for the 
five-year difference estimating sample.   The distributions for the samples in the other regressions are similar. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure B.1: Predicted Injury Rates in 2007 under Alternative Trade Environments 
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Appendix B.2 Online Data Appendix 
In this appendix, we provide further detail on our injury data and measurement. As we 
note in the main text, we take the Total Case Rate (TCR) as our main measure of worker 
injury rates.  It is calculated as TCR ൌ #୍୬୨୳୰୧ୣୱ	ୟ୬ୢ	୍୪୪୬ୣୱୱୣୱൈଶ଴଴,଴଴଴୘୭୲ୟ୪	୉୫୮୪୭୷ୣୣ	ୌ୭୳୰ୱ	୛୭୰୩ୣୢ .   
We evaluate the representativeness of our sample with regards to both SIC4 
industry coverage and the injury rates at plants in our sample.  First, we find that yearly 
industry employment in our sample is highly correlated with population estimates 
reported in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.823.  We next compare yearly industry averages of TCR within our 
sample (weighted by employment) to estimates for the full industry population reported 
by the BLS and find that the correlation coefficient to be 0.812.   We might expect it to 
be less than unity because our sample is not representative of the full population of 
workers – it does not cover those at plants with less than 40 employees. 
While the data are highly detailed and allow for the identification of the effect of 
import competition on injuries, they do not come without problems.  The size minimum 
for sampled plants was originally 60 employees in 1996 and 50 in 1997, and changed to 
40 thereafter.  Further, selection is based on a BLS record of employment that may not 
equal the amount reported in our data as a result of changes in employment over the year 
and potential reporting errors.44  Lastly, all states participated in the ODI program at first 
but several self-regulated states discontinued participation during our panel: OR, WA, 
and WY in 1997, SC in 1999, and AK and AZ in 2006.  We estimate our main 
specification using all eligible observations in the sample, but we run several robustness 
checks with respect to sample selection issues.  First, we estimate the model on a sample 
that excludes plants with imputed employment below the minimum for the year to 
account for potential misreporting.  We then further restrict the sample to exclude 
observations in all years with an employment measure of less than 60 FTE to address 
dynamic selection concerns associated with the changes in eligibility.  The first cut 
eliminates 14% of plant-year observations – representing 2% of employment – from the 
sample.  The second cut eliminates an additional 16% of plant year observations and 4% 
of employment.  Next, we drop all states that discontinued participation in the ODI 
program at any point during our data window to account for potential endogeneity due to 
non-random attrition at the state level, which account for about 2% each of total plant-
year observations and employment in the full sample.  Our overall conclusions remain the 
same for each robustness check.  
Lastly, plants that change SIC4-level industries across an interval of time are 
excluded from the sample for our difference specifications because the switch creates a 
spurious change in the industry-level measure of import competition and also likely 
                                                 
44 About 15% of observed plants have an imputed employment measure less than the year’s sampling 
minimum.  Most are just below the margin (likely symptomatic of a true disparity between recorded 
employment and imputed employment as fulltime equivalent of hours worked), but about 4% are less than 
half of the minimum (potentially due to inaccurate self-reporting). 
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affects injury rates via changes in production processes and technology.  For our 
estimating samples of changes over ݏ ൌ ሾ1,6ሿ years, this excludes 2.5%, 5.1%, 6.5%, 
7.3%, 8.3% and 9.3% of observations, respectively. 
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Appendix B.3 Online Theory Appendix 
In this appendix, we explain how we derive our reduced form estimating equations from 
the injury rate equation (1) in our theory.   
 For our main specification, we generalize equation (1) to derive a log linear 
specification for injury rates at plant ݅ in industry ݆ during year ݐ.  We consider 
heterogeneous injury costs ܿ௜௝௧ ൌ ߣ௜௝exp	ሺݐሻఏೕ݁ݔ݌ሺߠ௧ሻ, that vary in levels across 
industries and plants, trend at different rates within industries over time and  shocks that 
affect all industries and plants within a year. Take the log of both sides and linearize 
ln൫ߜ௜௝௧ ൅ ݎ൯ around ߜ∗ to get  
 
(B.3.1) ln ௜ܲ௝௧ ൌ lnሺߜ∗ ൅ ݎሻ ൅ ቀ ଵఋ∗ା௥ቁ ൫ߜ௜௝௧ െ ߜ∗൯ ൅ ln൫ܣ௜௝൯ ൅ θ୨ݐ െ ߠ௧ ൅ ߟ௜௝௧ 
 
where ܣ௜௝ ൌ ఈ೔ೕఊ೔ೕିఈ೔ೕ
ௗ೔ೕ
ఒ೔ೕ captures plant-specific effects and ߟ௜௝௧ captures approximation 
error.  Take differences over ݏ years to obtain   
 
(B.3.2) ln൫ ௜ܲ௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൌ ቀ ଵఋ∗ା௥ቁ ߜ௜௝௧:௧ା௦ ൅ θ୨ݏ െ ߠ௧௧:௧ା௦ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧. 
 
We do not observe survival rates, instead we specify shut-down rates as a function 
of firm size and a measure of import competition such that   
 
(B.3.3) ߜ௜௝௧:௧ା௦ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൅ ߙଶ ቀln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൈ ln ܮ௜௝௧	ቁ ൅ ߙଷ ln ܮ௜௝௧, 
 
where ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ is the log growth in US imports from China in industry ݆ during the 
years ݐ to ݐ ൅ ݏ45	and ܮ௜௝௧ is a measure of employment.  Based on the literature we expect 
ߙଵ ൐ 0   and ߙଶ ൏ 0.  Import competition raises shut-down rates (Bernard et al. 2006a; 
Pierce and Schott, 2013), especially at the least productive plants (Bernard et al. 2006b) 
with low levels of employment. 
We cannot estimate equation (B.3.3) structurally with our data because plant exit 
is indistinguishable from non-sampling in our unbalanced panel.  We instead substitute it 
into equation (B.3.2) and estimate the reduced form equation: 
 
(2)   ln൫ ௜ܲ௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൅ ߚଶ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൈ ln ܮ௜௝௧ 	൅ ߚଷ ln൫ܮ௜௝௧൯ 
 
൅ ௝߬ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧ 
 
                                                 
45 Our linear probability specification directly relates to existing empirical work which regresses an 
indicator for plant exit (survival) on the import competition measure.  
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where ߚ௞ ൌ ቀ ଵఋ∗ା௥ቁ ߙ௞. 
As an alternative, we also consider the level-difference specification of equation 
(1) which, approximating around the points ܿ௧ ൌ ܿ∗ and ߜ௜௝௧ ൌ ߜ∗, is given by 
 
(B.3.4) ௜ܲ௝௧:௧ା௦ ൌ ஺೔ೕ௖∗ ߜ௜௝௧:௧ା௦ ൅ ܣ௜௝ሺܿ௧ା௦ିଵ െ ܿ௧ି ଵሻሺߜ∗ ൅ ݎሻ ൅ ߟ௜௝௧. 
 
As before, we substitute equation (A3) for ߜ௜௝௧:௧ା௦ and derive the estimating 
equation  
 
(3)  ௜ܲ௝௧:௧ା௦ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൅ ߚଶ ln൫ܯ௨௖,௝൯௧:௧ା௦ ൈ ln ܮ௜௝௧ 	൅ ߚଷ ln൫ܮ௜௝௧൯ 
 
൅ߠ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧. 
 
where ߚ௜ ൌ ஺೔ೕ௖∗ ߙ௜. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EFFECTS OF IMPORT COMPETITION ON HEALTH IN THE 
LOCAL ECONOMY 
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This paper is collaborative work with Georg Schaur at the University of Tennessee. 
Abstract  
We study the effects of Chinese import exposure in the US on self-reported health 
measures. We find that average mental, physical, and general health worsens in local 
labor markets exposed to greater import competition between 2000 and 2007. The effects 
are greatest for mental health. Moving a region from the 25th to 75th percentile of import 
exposure corresponds to a 5.5% increase in the time individuals report suffering from 
poor mental health, adding about 0.18 days per month. The effects are greatest for the 
employed, consistent with theory from the health literature pertaining to the documented 
effects of import competition on wages, employment and job security. These estimates 
provide direct evidence that trade affects welfare through changes in overall mental and 
physical well-being. 
3.1 Introduction 
The trade literature documents consequences of globalization for employment and labor 
market conditions that are separately identified in the health literature as important 
determinants of mental and physical health among affected workers and their families.  
The intersection of the two literatures suggests that trade affects welfare through changes 
in health, which are overlooked by traditional gains-from-trade estimates based on real 
wages and employment.  Looking at one channel, recent work by McManus and Schaur 
(2015) and Hummels, Munch, and Xiang (2015) finds that globalization affects 
workplace injuries and illnesses.  Studies in the health literature imply more far-reaching 
implications, however.  Further, recent work by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) finds 
that import exposure affects labor market outcomes throughout the local economy and 
not just in import-competing industries.  In this paper, we study how the surge in Chinese 
import exposure in US labor markets, driven by Chinese productivity gains and falling 
trade costs, has affected overall mental and physical health outcomes.  Our empirical 
results close the gap between these recent findings and provide evidence of broader 
health effects of trade.   
We combine Autor et al.’s strategy for identifying import exposure at the local 
labor market-level with health microdata from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) to study the causal relationship.  To generate a regional measure of 
import exposure per-worker, Chinese imports in each manufacturing industry are mapped 
to Census commuting zones (CZ) based on the share of the local labor force employed in 
the industry.46  An instrumental variables strategy exogenously identifies the change in 
imports explained by Chinese supply shocks, as opposed to demand shocks that may 
otherwise be correlated with health outcomes.   
                                                 
46 Differences in employment composition across regions provide the identifying variation in the model.  
Anecdotally, the intuition is that a surge in automobile imports will disproportionately affect Detroit given 
the relative concentration of its workforce in the industry. 
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Our results show that Chinese import competition in local labor markets tends to 
worsen self-reported mental, physical, and overall health.  Moving a CZ from the 25th 
percentile to the 75th percentile of import exposure in 2000-2007 explains a 1.06 
percentage point increase in the share of the population rating their general health as fair 
or poor, a 6.7% increase over the mean.  The effects are greatest for mental health, which 
encompasses stress, anxiety, and depression.  An increase in import exposure equal to the 
interquartile range adds 0.18 additional days of poor mental health to the average 
resident’s month, 5.5% of the sample mean.  The incidence of poor physical health days, 
encompassing injury and illness, among the total population is weakly increasing in 
import competition.   
The adverse health effects are greatest among the employed and especially those 
working for wages (as opposed to self-employed).  Among that group, import 
competition significantly increases the average number of poor mental health days 
(p<0.01) and the number of poor physical health days (p<0.10), as well as the population 
share reporting some incidence of poor mental health (p<0.10) and some incidence of 
poor physical health (p<0.05). Given that import exposure is shown to increase firm 
shutdown rates in competing industries (Pierce and Schott, 2013; Bloom et al., 2012; 
Bernard et al., 2006a, 2006b), these results are consistent with evidence in the health 
literature that job insecurity hurts worker mental and physical well-being (Cheng and 
Chan, 2008; Sverke et al., 2002).   
Our results provide direct evidence that changes in the trade environment have 
consequences for overall mental and physical health, and they complement recent 
findings for occupational injury and illness.  In particular, the deterioration in physical 
health among the employed that we identify here corroborates findings in McManus and 
Schaur (2015) that Chinese import shocks increase worker injury and illness rates at US 
manufacturers in competing industries.  Other related work by Hummels et al. (2015) 
meanwhile looks at export shocks and finds that exogenous export growth at Danish 
firms increases occupational injuries and illnesses and increases incidence of severe 
depression.  We contribute to these studies in the following ways:  First, we identify a 
broader range of health effects by using measures of overall mental, physical, and general 
health rather than specific outcomes like occupational injury or visits to a psychiatrist 
only.  Second, our analysis at the regional level captures spillover effects within local 
economies of the sort identified in Autor et al. (2013), as well as interpersonal spillovers 
such as the mental health costs of spousal job insecurity (Wilson, 1993) and job loss 
(Marcus, 2013; Bubonya et al., 2014),  and therefore captures a greater share of the total 
health effects. We also capture indirect effects that arise from workers being displaced by 
import exposure into unemployment or lower-paying jobs (as found in Ebenstein et al., 
2014).  To our knowledge, this is the first paper to look at the effects of trade on overall 
health in the economy, and we present the first evidence that directly links import 
competition to mental health.   
We also make use of data on access to medical care to provide new evidence on 
the consequences of import competition with relevance for healthcare policy.  We find 
that increasing 2000-2007 import exposure in a region by the interquartile range of $1000 
per worker increases the share of the employed who are unable to afford necessary 
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medical care by 2.4 percentage points over that time, a 24% increase over the sample 
mean.  These findings suggest that the welfare costs of the health effects identified in this 
paper and in McManus and Schaur (2015) may be compounded by import competition 
hurting people’s ability to pay for the needed medical care.  The health costs of import 
shocks may be lower under socialized healthcare systems or mandated employer health 
plans that shield workers from an endogenous fall in their health insurance coverage. We 
find a positive but insignificant relationship between import exposure and the share of 
people without health coverage.   
This paper also contributes to existing evidence on the local labor market effects 
of globalization, including McLaren and Hakobyan’s (2012) study of the effects of 
NAFTA and Autor et al.’s (2013) study of Chinese import exposure.47  We employ the 
methodology from Autor et al. such that our results for health outcomes directly compare 
to theirs for the fall in average wages, employment, and labor market participation.  Their 
estimates imply that an additional $1000 in Chinese import exposure per worker results 
in a 0.8 percentage point reduction in log weekly earnings and a 4.5% fall in 
manufacturing employment.  In comparison, our estimates imply a 6.8% increase in the 
share of the population with fair or poor general health and a 5.7% increase in days of 
poor mental health for the equivalent shock.    
Lastly, this paper contributes to the literature on the macro- and microeconomic 
determinants of health, much of which focusses on the effects of business cycle 
fluctuations and unemployment.  Employment status and job security are robustly linked 
to mental health and subjective well-being. 48  Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) estimate 
it would take $108,000/year49 to compensate a man for the disutility associated with 
being unemployed.  Luechinger et al. (2010) and Clark et al. (2010) find that high 
unemployment rates hurt the employed also via greater economic distress and fear of job 
loss.  Studies in occupational health and organizational psychology document the 
consequences of greater job insecurity for various mental and physical health outcomes, 
including stress, anxiety, depression, hostility, somatization, high blood pressure, heart 
disease, and stroke.50  Our results show that the trade environment, like the business 
cycle, is an important determinant of mental and physical health in the economy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
related literature; Section 3 presents the data and measurement; Section 4 explains the 
empirical specification and discusses identification; Section 5 provides the results; 
Section 6 presents robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.  Tables and figures are 
provided in Appendix C.1. 
                                                 
47 See also Kovak (2013) for a specific-factors model of wage and price changes within a regional economy 
and empirical support from Brazil, along with Chiquiar (2008) and Topalova (2010) for empirical evidence 
of local labor market effects in Mexico and India, respectively.   
48 For example, see Karsten and Moser (2009) and McKee-Ryan et al. (2005) for studies on unemployment, 
and see Cheng and Chan (2008), Sverke et al. (2002), and De Witte (1999) for the effects of job insecurity 
on worker health. 
49 In 2015USD, converted from their estimate of $60,000 in 1990USD. 
50 For a review of that literature, see meta-analyses by Bohle et al. (2001) and Sverke et al. (2002). 
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3.2 Related Literature 
Chinese exports to the US and the rest of the world surged in the 2000’s, driven by 
Chinese productivity gains related to its transition to a market-oriented economy (Chen, 
Jin, and Yue, 2010) and falling trade costs associated with its accession to the WTO in 
2001 (Pierce and Schott, 2013).  The intersection of evidence in the trade and health 
literatures explains several channels for these import shocks to affect mental and physical 
health in the US both positively and negatively.   
Import shocks predominately reduce employment in import-competing industries, 
as Pierce and Schott (2013) show for US manufacturers following the trade liberalization 
towards China.  Displaced workers switch to other occupations and industries where 
wages are lower (Ebenstein et al., 2014) or enter unemployment, where mental and 
physical health suffers (Karsten and Moser, 2009; McKee-Ryan et al., 2005).  Job loss 
carries additional health costs beyond those of being unemployed only (Kassenboehmer 
and Haisken-DeNew, 2009) and is directly linked to greater mortality rates (Sullivan and 
von Wachter, 2009).  Workers who remain employed in import-competing industries face 
more tenuous employment conditions as firm shutdown rates rise (Pierce and Schott, 
2013; Bloom et al., 2012, Bernard et al., 2006a, 2006b).  The health literature explains 
this will hurt mental and physical health, as job insecurity is in part associated with 
greater stress and anxiety and increased risk of heart disease and stroke. (Cheng and 
Chan, 2008; Sverke et al., 2002; De Witte, 1999).   
Studies on health and the business cycle explain mechanisms through which 
import competition can improve health as well.  Ruhm (2000) finds that physical health 
outcomes improve during a recession, an effect that subsequent work attributes to a fall in 
working hours (Ruhm, 2005) and decreased economic activity such as driving (Miller et 
al., 2009).    
The evidence on the effect of income on health is mixed, due in part to challenges 
in dealing with reverse causality.51  Ettner (1996) finds that an exogenous increase in 
income improves mental and physical health, and Lindahl (2005) reports sizeable positive 
effects for overall health and mortality risk as well.  Frijters et al. (2005) finds a positive 
but very small effect on self-reported general health, meanwhile Meer et al. (2003) finds 
that the effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero and Ruhm (2005) does not 
find evidence that income changes explain the health effects of the business cycle.  These 
collective results suggest that wage losses from import competition will tend to weakly 
worsen health outcomes, or else have no effect at all. 
Work-related injuries and illnesses are another important contributor to overall 
health, and the main channel thus far explored in the recent literature on trade shocks and 
health.  McManus and Schaur (2015) finds that worker injuries and illnesses go up in US 
manufacturing industries hit with Chinese import competition, especially at the smallest 
and least productive establishments.  The theory in that paper explains that marginal 
firms sacrifice safety for productivity when import shocks lower the firm’s survival rate 
                                                 
51 Notably, reverse causality issues would not seem to threaten our analysis here as country-level trade 
flows are presumably exogenous of individual health outcomes.   
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and the likelihood it incurs long-run costs for its workers’ injuries.  The empirical 
analysis focusses on within-firm effects only, however, and does not capture labor market 
reallocations.  Occupational health will improve for workers displaced into safer jobs, 
though the associated wage losses (per Ebenstein et al.) potentially dampen the effects on 
overall health. Our analysis in this paper captures these general equilibrium effects by 
looking at overall health outcomes across the labor market.  Hummels et al. (2015) also 
document the link between trade and occupational health: they find that exogenous export 
shocks at Danish firms increase worker injuries and sick days, a result they attribute to 
greater work intensity as firms respond to positive demand shocks.52 Looking to mental 
health, they find that export shocks increase workers’ likelihood of visiting a psychiatrist 
and taking anti-depressants.  Our study complements their results in looking at mental 
and physical health outcomes in the US and as a consequence of import competition.   
We follow Autor et al. (2013) and estimate the aggregate effects of import 
competition at the regional (subnational) level.  In comparison to McManus and Schaur 
(2015) and Hummels et al. (2015), this spatial identification strategy captures both health 
effects among workers who are displaced by import competition into other industries or 
occupations (per Ebenstein et al., 2014) and indirect effects that arise due to spillovers 
within affected regions.  Autor et al. document the importance of the latter channel: they 
find that Chinese import exposure significantly lowered wages at non-manufacturing jobs 
in regions with a high concentration of import-competing firms.  Further, there is also 
reason to believe the consequences for workers adversely affect their spouse’s mental 
health, as Wilson (1993) shows for job insecurity and Marcus (2013) and Bubonya et al. 
(2014) show for job loss and unemployment, and our analysis at the regional level 
captures these indirect effects also.  One cost of this strategy is that we are left with 
considerably fewer observations than firm-level analyses; however, there is still 
considerable variation in both trade shocks and health outcomes across regions, as 
discussed below.    
3.3 Data and Measurement 
The trade data comes directly from Autor et al. (2013) and is discussed in more detail 
there.  Briefly, they construct a per-capita measure of import competition within a local 
labor market in the following manner: first, they map UN Comtrade data on US imports 
from China at the HS6 product level to the SIC4 industries that manufacture each 
product.  Next, they apportion each industry’s imports to local labor markets– defined as 
the 722 Census commuting zones (CZ) covering the mainland US – based on their share 
of national industry employment. The result is the following per-capita measure of the 
change in Chinese import exposure in local labor market ݅ following base year ݐ: 
 
                                                 
52 Different channels explain why both import and export shocks can adversely affect worker health.  This 
is consistent with evidence in Sokejima and Kagamimori (1998) of a U-shaped relationship between 
working hours and myocardial infarctions and findings in the occupational safety and health literature that 
show both shorter and longer work schedules can increase injury rates.   
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(5) Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௧௎ௌ ൌ ∑ ௅೔ೕ೟௅೔೟
୼ெೕ೟ೆೄ
௅ೕ೟௝  
 
where ࡸ࢏࢐࢚ࡸ࢏࢚  is the share of region ݅’s labor force employed in industry ݆ in the base year and 
Δܯ௝௧௎ௌ/ܮ௝௧ is the per-worker growth in US imports from China in the industry (in 
$1000s).  The variation in this measure is driven by heterogeneity in the employment 
structure across CZs.  In particular, Autor et al. note that 75% of the variation is driven by 
differences in manufacturing industry concentration, with the remainder explained by 
variation in manufacturing versus non-manufacturing employment.  For use as an 
instrument, they also construct a similar measure that uses lagged employment and 
growth in Chinese imports in an aggregate of eight other high income countries53: 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௧ை்ு ൌ ∑ ࡸ࢏࢐࢚ష૚ࡸ࢏࢚ష૚
୼ெೕ೟ೀ೅ಹ
ࡸ࢐࢚ష૚࢐ .  Along with Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௧
௎ௌ and Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௧ை்ு for the period 2000-
2007, we use their data for CZ data on population, employment and demographics that 
are used as control variables.    
The health data comes from the Center of Disease Control’s Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).54  BRFSS is a national telephone survey that 
monitors a broad range of health-related behaviors and outcomes.  As part of the core set 
of questions, the survey asks respondents the number of days in the last month that their 
mental health was not good and the number of days their physical health was not good.55  
Respondents are also asked to rate their general health on a five-point scale from poor to 
excellent. 
We use individual responses in 2000 and 2007 to create variables on the change in 
average health outcomes within commuting zones over this period.  These variables are: 
population share reporting fair or poor general health, share reporting some days of poor 
mental (physical) health in the past month, and the average number of poor mental 
(physical) health days reported.56   Table C.1 provides summary statistics for these health 
measures for both CZs and for the individual microdata used to construct the CZ-level 
outcomes, along with statistics on the within-CZ coverage of the data.  Figure C.1 shows 
the distributions of CZ health outcomes for the pooled 2000 and 2007 samples.  We also 
use BRFSS data on employment status to calculate the respective health measures within 
the subgroups of: employed, self-employed, employed for wages, unemployed (out of 
                                                 
53 These are: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland. 
54 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Survey 
Data. Atlanta, Georgia: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2000, 2007. 
55 Specifically, they were asked: “Thinking about your mental health, which includes stress, depression, and 
problems with emotions, for how many days during the past 30 was your mental health not good?”, and 
“Thinking about your physical health, which includes physical illness and injury, for how many days 
during the past 30 days was your physical health not good?”. 
56 We map the counties reported in BRFSS to CZs using a crosswalk from Autor et al. (2013).  We thank 
them for making this publicly available on David Dorn’s website.  
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work), and homemakers. More detailed job information, such as occupation and industry 
of employment, are not available in the data.  
BRFSS is well-suited to this application for three reasons: First, it is administered 
to a representative sample across the entire US and all respondents are asked the same 
core questions, providing a comparable measure across regions.  Second, the survey has 
asked these same core questions about health annually since 1993, such that we have an 
identical measure of health in 2000 and 2007 to compare. Third, BRFSS is the largest 
health survey in the world and provides large sample sizes even within regions defined as 
narrowly as CZs.  On average, there are 681 individuals used to estimate each CZ-year 
measure in our estimating sample; the median is 303 and none are comprised of fewer 
than 44 individuals. 
One issue that arises in using BRFSS data for our analysis is that small counties 
are censored in the data.  As a result, we are only able to derive health measures for 340 
CZs, as the rest are comprised entirely of censored counties.  Further, the coverage within 
the CZs that we do observe will be biased towards urban residents if some counties in the 
CZ are censored.  We discuss the threats to identification that stem from this data 
limitation below.   
3.4 Identification 
In this section, we present the empirical model that we take to the data on regional import 
exposure and health outcomes.  We then discuss potential identification concerns.   
Let ݅ denote commuting zones and ݐ denote years.  The reduced form model for 
the change in a CZ health outcome ௜ܱ௧ is given by:  
 
(6) Δ ௜ܱ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚΔܫܲ ௜ܹ௧௎ௌ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ Δߝ௜௧ 
 
where Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௧௎ௌ is the measure of Chinese import exposure and ௜ܺ௧ is a vector of CZ 
characteristics in the base year that are independent of the ensuing growth in imports.   
Any time invariant CZ characteristics related to health outcomes are differenced out.  The 
common change in health outcomes across all CZs is captured by the constant.  In most 
regressions, we also include Census division dummies (as in Autor et al., 2013) that 
allow for different trends across the nine major regions of the US.57   We do not log 
transform ௜ܱ௧ because the distribution in levels is relatively normal (see Figure C.1) and 
there a considerable number of zeros in some of the CZ-level data for smaller subgroups 
(e.g. no homemakers in the CZ sample report poor or fair general health).   
We set out to identify the health effects of import exposure driven by China’s 
productivity gains and falling trade costs.  Import growth is correlated with demand 
shocks, however, which will bias OLS estimates for ߚ if demand shocks are also 
                                                 
57 The Census divisions are: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South 
Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. 
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correlated with health outcomes as the literature suggests.58  We follow Autor et al. and 
address the concern by using Chinese import growth in other OECD countries to 
instrument for the growth in the US.  The instrument Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௧ை்ு is also constructed using 
ten-year lagged employment values to account for any potential anticipation effects that 
may render base-year employment endogenous to the ensuing import growth.  We 
estimate equation (6) using two-stage least squares (2SLS), where the first stage regresses 
the endogenous Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௧௎ௌ on the instrument Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௧ை்ு, along with the controls in the 
second-stage equation.  The identifying assumption here is that the common growth in 
imports across the markets is driven by Chinese supply shocks and not demand-side 
factors that are potentially correlated with health outcomes.   Under the additional 
assumption that Δܫܲ෣ܹ௜௧௎ௌ is uncorrelated with Δߝ௜௧, the OLS estimate of ߚ in equation (6) 
using Δܫܲ෣ܹ௜௧௎ௌ consistently identifies the net effect of import exposure on regional health 
averages.59  
Autor et al. identify several threats to the validity of the IV in their study on 
wages and employment that are relevant here also.  First, product demand shocks in the 
US and other high-income countries may be correlated such that the IV estimate does not 
exogenously capture supply-side effects only.  They check this by employing a gravity 
identification strategy that isolates import growth attributable to changes in China’s 
productivity and trade costs only and find similar results.  They conclude their IV results 
are not driven by correlated demand shocks, and so we proceed with the same assumption 
for these health effects.  Next, it may be the case that US producers who suffer adverse 
productivity shocks are supplanted by Chinese imports in US and other OECD markets, 
but it is more likely that China’s export growth is driven by the huge gains in its own 
productivity, which grew by about 8% during this time (Brandt et al., 2012), more than 
double that in the US.  Finally, the correlated growth in Chinese imports across the 
markets may be driven by common technology shocks that hurt labor-intensive industries 
at home.  That Chinese export growth dwarfed that of other low and middle-income 
nations, however, suggests that the growth was instead driven by falling trade costs and 
productivity shocks unique to China.  Notably, the OLS estimates for ߚ are generally 
lower than the IV estimates, suggesting that any remaining correlation between the IV 
estimates for Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௧௎ௌ and demand shocks will bias against finding adverse health effects 
in the 2SLS results. 
The next concern for identification is that import exposure in a region drives 
changes in the composition of the population that are related to health outcomes.  This 
would change average health outcomes within a CZ over time independent of any 
changes in individual health.  This seems unlikely, however.  Autor et al. (2013) find no 
significant relationship between CZ import exposure and population size or composition 
                                                 
58 For example, Ruhm (2000) and others relate income and employment shocks to health.  Under the IV 
assumption, our analysis will only capture the health effects of these shocks to the extent they are 
correlated with import exposure.  
59 We opt to use OLS instead of a fractional logit regression for the population shares reporting poor 
mental/physical/general health outcomes because we cannot difference out CZ fixed effects in the nonlinear 
logit specification and a FE specification with T=2 suffers from an incidental parameters problem.   
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across age or education level.60  Still, we regress import competition on CZ age, gender, 
and racial demographics from our sample as a robustness check to test that import 
exposure is not shifting the makeup of the population along these potential covariates of 
health outcomes.  
Another concern for our identification is that cross-sectional differences in 
commuting zones might systematically explain both import exposure and trends in health.  
In this case our estimates would not identify a causal link between import exposure and 
health, but rather a spurious relationship driven by an omitted variable bias.  In a 
robustness check, we regress the 1993-1999 change in poor health outcomes on future 
import exposure in 2000-2007 to test for a relationship between the shock in a CZ and 
long run health trends.   
Last, we note that the estimating sample is not representative of the entire US 
population.  County identifiers in the public BRFSS data are censored for low-population 
counties and so we cannot assign these individuals to commuting zones when calculating 
the average health measures.61  We can only generate CZ averages for 340 of the 722 
commuting zones covering the US.  The out-of-sample regions are the most sparsely 
populated, such that the estimating sample of CZ-level changes that we use is 
representative of about 71% of the national population.62  Manufacturing employment 
shares and import exposure per worker are not significantly different across the CZs 
covered in our sample and those not.  To the extent that other factors determine the 
effects of import competition on health, however, our results will not be representative of 
these out-of-sample areas. 
3.5 Results 
We first estimate equation (2) on the primary health measures for the overall population: 
share of the CZ reporting fair or poor general health, average days of poor mental health 
per month, and average days of poor physical health per month.  The 2SLS results are 
shown in Table C.2.  In all regressions CZ observations are weighted by base-year 
population and standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for unobserved 
correlation across CZs in a state (e.g. due to a change in a state health program during the 
period).63   The first-stage regression results for each specification are presented in the 
                                                 
60 Autor et al. cite findings in Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) that show 
people are slow to move following labor demand shocks, most of all workers without a college education 
(Notowidigdo, 2013), a prominent share of manufacturing labor.  
61 Counties are censored if there are less than 50 individuals in the BRFSS sample in a year.  The censoring 
is more prevalent in earlier years, which had smaller sample sizes – e.g. the sample size grew from about 
180,000 to 430,000 between 2000 and 2007, amounting to greater coverage within counties and fewer 
being censored.   
62 About 32% of individual observations are in counties that are either censored in 2000 or 2007, but this 
represents only 29% of the national population (adjusting for sampling weights).   
63 The results are qualitatively similar when observations are weighted instead by number of employed 
workers and number of unemployed workers in the CZ in the base-year.  Keeping the weights constant 
across specifications ensures that they are not responsible for differences in the estimates for the full 
population and the subgroups broken out in Table 3.   
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first columns and thereafter suppressed.  The coefficient estimates and robust F-statistics 
from a weak instruments test reveal that the instrument is significantly correlated with US 
import exposure in each specification.    
In Table C.2, the first column for each health measure is a univariate regression of 
its change on the contemporaneous change in import exposure.  The results show that the 
markers for poor general health and poor mental health are significantly and positively 
correlated with import exposure, while the effect on poor physical health is positive but 
not statistically significant.  The second specification adds dummies for the nine Census 
divisions and the third adds the full set of controls from Autor, Dorn, and Hanson’s 
(2013) regressions for employment and wage changes.  These additional covariates are: 
the share of the population employed in manufacturing, the share with a college 
education, the percentage that are foreign-born, the percentage of employment among 
women, the share of workers employed in routine occupations, and the average 
offshorability index of the occupations.  We consider that these potential correlates of 
trends in other labor market outcomes can also be correlated with changes in health, 
along with import exposure, and so they belong in the estimating equation.  The 
additional controls increase the magnitude of the estimated effect of import competition 
for share of fair/poor general health and average poor mental days, which both remain 
statistically significant, while the effect on poor physical days remains positive but not 
significantly different from zero.  We regard the specification with the full set of controls 
as our preferred model. 
 The coefficients give the estimated effect of a $1000 increase in competing 
Chinese imports per worker in the CZ over a seven-year period.  As this is the 
approximate interquartile range for import exposure in our sample, the coefficients 
translate to the implied effects of moving a CZ from the 25th percentile of import 
exposure to the 75th percentile.  We estimate that this shock adds about 0.18 days/month 
of poor mental health for the average adult in the CZ, a 5.5% increase over the sample 
mean.  It increases the population share with fair or poor general health by 1.06 
percentage points ceteris paribus, 6.7% of the mean.  These results are comparable in 
magnitude to estimates in McManus and Schaur (2015) that imply increasing import 
exposure in an industry by the interquartile range increases worker injury rates by 10% 
over five years at the median plant size.   
It is a priori unclear what drives the decline in overall health and mental health in 
particular.  One candidate explanation from the literature is that workers face greater job 
insecurity and stress at work as a result of Chinese import competition.  These effects 
would be concentrated among the employed.  Another explanation is that import 
competition exerts greater stress and anxiety on the unemployed, who face worse 
prospects for reemployment.  We make use of employment status in the data to identify 
the relative contributions of each to the overall effects.  We construct CZ measures of 
each health outcome using the subsample of observations in the BRFSS data that are 
employed and that are unemployed and estimate the model on the difference in outcomes 
within each group in 2000 and in 2007. Table C.3 gives the estimates of equation (6) for 
each health measure across each of the employment subgroups.  In this table we also 
estimate the model for the share of the population reporting any incidence of poor mental 
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health and any incidence of poor physical health.  The results in panel B show that health 
is worsening especially among the employed, who are more likely to report both poor 
mental health days (p<0.10) and poor physical health days (p<0.05) as a result of greater 
import competition.  The estimates imply that employed adults in a CZ with import 
exposure at the 75th percentile will all else equal have an additional 0.31 days of poor 
health per month than their counterparts in a CZ at the 25th percentile, a 9.3% increase 
over the sample mean.  Shown in panel C, the effects are even greater for the subset of 
the employed working for wages (as opposed to self-employed).  These results are 
consistent with the documented effects of job insecurity on mental and physical health, 
though we cannot directly test the mechanism here.64  The estimates in panel D show that 
for the unemployed import exposure weakly improves mental health and has the opposite 
effect on physical and general health, however none of the results are statistically 
significant. 65  
Another empirical question is to what extent these health effects spillover 
throughout the economy.  The health psychology literature argues that health outcomes 
are interpersonally determined: Wilson et al. (1993) finds that job insecurity affects 
spousal stress and mental well-being, and Marcus (2013) and Bubonya et al. (2014) 
provide similar evidence for unemployment.  To test for this with our data, we estimate 
the model for the CZ-level health measures among individuals who self-identify as 
homemakers.  The results, shown in Table C.3, do not provide any evidence of adverse 
spousal health effects.  Instead, there is weak evidence that mental and physical health 
improves among this subgroup.66  
We lastly consider how import competition affects health through changes in 
access to healthcare, a prominent concern for policymakers.  For one, health outcomes 
might deteriorate because individuals struggle to afford medical care as a result of import 
exposure. Individuals in BRFSS report whether there was a time in the past year when 
they needed to see a doctor but could not because of the cost.  We regress the change in 
this measure on import exposure to test for the relationship. The results for the total 
population, the employed, and the employed for wages are shown in the first three 
columns of Table C.4.  The estimated coefficient of interest is positive and statistically 
significant for all three groups, indicating that import exposure increases the share of 
people who find themselves unable to afford necessary healthcare.  The effects are 
greatest for the employed and even more so for those employed for wages.  For that 
group, the coefficient estimate implies that increasing import exposure by the 
interquartile range of $1000 per worker increases the share of wage-earners unable to 
afford medical care by 2.4 percentage points, almost one-quarter of the average of 10%.  
                                                 
64 Another candidate explanation is that well-being deteriorates for workers displaced into other industries 
or occupations as a result of import competition, a consequence documented by Ebenstein et al. (2014).  
65 For one, the gains in mental health are consistent with the finding in Clark (2003) that the unemployed 
benefit from a “social norm effect” as more people become unemployed.    
66 For one, this is consistent with homemakers from lower-income households leaving that group for 
employment and leaving a wealthier and healthier population of homemakers as a result.  This can also be 
explained by trade liberalization increasing wages for the most skilled workers, to whom homemakers are 
more likely married. 
81 
 
In addition to imposing welfare costs in its own right, reduced access to health care 
would seem to exacerbate the other health consequences of import competition, including 
the occupational injury and illness effects identified in McManus and Schaur (2015).  In 
conjunction, these results imply that import competition both increases injuries and 
illnesses and reduces workers’ ability to pay for related medical care.   
That workers are more likely to be priced out of medical care because of import 
exposure can in part be attributed to the documented wage losses in affected CZs (Autor 
et al., 2013), but another explanation is that firms respond to import competition by 
downgrading or canceling worker health plans such that workers cannot afford the higher 
co-pays or uncovered medical expenses.  Universal healthcare in Denmark helps shut 
down this channel in Hummels et al.’s (2015) study on worker injury and illness, but it is 
a potentially important margin of adjustment in economies with private healthcare 
systems – like the US during this period – and one of particular importance to policy 
makers.  To look at endogenous changes in insurance coverage using the BRFSS data, we 
regress the change in the share of people without any health coverage on import 
exposure.  The results are shown in columns 4-6 of Table C.4.  The estimated coefficient 
of interest is positive for all groups and greatest for wage employees, but it is not 
statistically different from zero in the specification with the full set of controls and so we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that import competition does not affect health coverage.  
3.6 Robustness Checks 
We run several robustness checks related to our identifying assumptions and alternative 
specifications.  First, we address our assumption that changes in the population which are 
correlated with health are not driven by import competition.  We regress equation (6) on 
changes in demographic variables in our data to test if these potential covariates of health 
outcomes are in fact endogenous to our measure of import exposure, which would bias 
our main results.  The results are shown in Table C.5.  Shown in the first row of 
estimates, we do not find any evidence that import exposure within a CZ significantly 
affects the composition of the overall population across gender, age, or race during the 
seven-year interval.  These results with our sample data are consistent with evidence on 
age and education presented in Autor et al. (2013).67  We also look at potential 
endogenous changes in the composition of the population in the employment status 
groups we look at above.  For example, we may be concerned that import exposure 
disproportionately displaces older workers – who tend to have better mental health 
outcomes – and this change in the composition of the employed contributes to the 
positive relationship between import exposure and poor mental health that we identify.  
This does not appear to be the case, however.  The estimates in the lower rows of Table 
                                                 
67 Time-varying individual outcomes like educational attainment are potentially endogenous – Greenland 
and Lopresti (2013), for example, shows high school dropout rates fall in US labor markets exposed to 
Chinese import competition.  
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C.5 reveal that import competition does not generally explain changes in population 
characteristics with any degree of statistical significance.68    
We next consider the threat that some unobserved CZ characteristics explain both 
the change in health and the level of import exposure such that our identification suffers 
from omitted variable bias.  We look at this by regressing the change in health outcomes 
in 1993-1999 on the future import growth in 2000-2007 to test for pre-trends.   A positive 
relationship would suggest that CZ characteristics which are correlated with long run 
deteriorations in average health are also correlated with greater import exposure.   The 
results for each health outcome by subgroup are shown in Table C.6.  We instead find a 
weakly negative relationship in most cases, especially for mental health: areas with high 
import exposure were seeing relative improvements in health preceding the 2000-2007 
shock.  Assuming health trends in 1993-1999 and 2000-2007 are positively related, these 
results indicate that the potential bias – if there is any – works against our main findings.   
We conclude that our results are not driven by omitted CZ characteristics that explain 
both trends in health and import exposure. 
3.7 Conclusion 
We find empirical evidence that Chinese import exposure in the US worsened average 
health outcomes in affected local labor markets.  The estimates imply that the mean 
import shock in a region increased the share of the population reporting fair or poor 
general health by 6.7%.  The effects are greatest for self-reported mental health. The 
mean shock increases the incidence of poor mental health among all adults by 0.18 days 
per month, about 5.5% of the average.  Self-reported mental and physical health 
especially worsens among the employed.  The results are consistent with the intersection 
of evidence that import competition reduces employment, wages, and job security, and 
findings in the health literature that link these channels to worse mental and physical 
health.   
 Looking to related policy implications, we find that import exposure significantly 
increases the share of people who are at times unable to afford necessary medical care.  
This suggests that the injury and illness effects of import competition in the workplace 
and beyond may be exacerbated by reduced access to healthcare.  The health costs of 
trade shocks will likely be less under a system of social healthcare or mandatory 
employer-provided health plans that cannot be endogenously downgraded or eliminated.  
Further research with richer data can provide additional insight on how trade affects 
health insurance coverage and quality, workers’ ability to afford healthcare, and other 
non-wage determinants of mental and physical health outcomes.  
                                                 
68 One exception among wage employees is that import competition appears to weakly displace white 
workers from that group and replace them with Hispanic workers.  Regressing changes in self-reported 
health on changes in racial makeup across all adults – which we find to be exogenous to import exposure in 
the first row of Table C.5 – reveals that Hispanics tend to report fewer days of poor mental and physical 
health than white non-Hispanics.  This shift in the racial makeup of wage-earning workers would therefore 
seem to bias against our results. 
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Appendix C.1 Tables and Figures 
Table C.1. Summary Statistics of BRFSS Data 
 N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Individual-Year Data 
Days/Month of Poor Mental Health 457905 3.36 7.61 0 30 
Indicator: ൐ 0 Poor Mental Days 457905 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Days/Month of Poor Physical Health 456684 4.00 8.51 0 30 
Indicator: ൐ 0 Poor Physical Days 456684 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Indicator: General Health Fair or Poor 465040 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Sample Sizes Within Commuting Zone-Year Aggregates 
Full Sample 340 681.5 1184.3 44 14180
Employed 340 388.8 675.3 24 7814 
Self-Employed 339 57.2 101.0 1 1181 
Employed for Wages 340 331.7 577.6 21 6742 
Unemployed 314 25.9 49.8 1 672 
Homemakers 335 53.5 89.7 1 1140 
Commuting Zone-Year Data 
Average Days of Poor Mental Health 680 3.27 0.86 0.40 6.39 
2000-2007 Change 340 0.15 1.02 -2.97 3.85 
Share Reporting Poor Mental Days (ppts) 680 32.4 6.3 10.3 52.2 
2000-2007 Change 340 0.01 7.5 -25.3 26.9 
Average Days of Poor Physical Health 680 3.55 0.97 0.58 7.93 
2000-2007 Change 340 0.42 1.01 -2.38 5.11 
Share Reporting Poor Physical Days (ppts) 680 34.3 5.4 13.7 56.8 
2000-2007 Change 340 2.2 6.9 -15.8 31.4 
Share Reporting Fair/Poor Gen. Health (ppts) 680 15.8 5.5 0.3 36.7 
2000-2007 Change 340 1.8 4.7 -13.8 16.2 
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Table C.2. Chinese Import Shocks and Health Outcomes in Local Labor Markets: 2SLS Estimates 
 General Health 
Share Reporting Fair or Poor (ppts) 
Mental Health 
Average Poor Days/Month 
Physical Health 
Average Poor Days/Month 
 (G.1) (G.2) (G.3) (M.1) (M.2) (M.3) (P.1) (P.2) (P.3) 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.575** 
(0.283) 
0.706** 
(0.319) 
1.063**  
(0.427) 
0.107*** 
(0.373) 
0.120*** 
(0.036) 
0.183*** 
(0.091) 
0.070 
(0.048) 
0.081 
(0.052) 
0.075 
(0.064) 
Initial Mfg. Emp. 
Share   
-0.090 
(0.076)   
-0.018 
(0.017)   
-0.003 
(0.013) 
Initial Share College-
Educ.   
0.072 
(0.056)   
-0.015 
(0.014)   
0.003 
(0.010) 
Initial Share Foreign-
Born   
-0.026 
(0.030)   
-0.019** 
(0.010)   
-0.008 
(0.007) 
Initial Female Emp. 
Rate   
-0.090 
(0.080)   
-0.028 
(0.023)   
-0.009 
(0.014) 
Initial Emp. Share in 
Routine Occ.   
-0.164 
(0.263)   
0.015 
(0.030)   
-0.059** 
(0.026) 
Avg. Offshorability 
Index of Initial Occ.   -0.636 (1.848)   
0.135 
(0.227)   
0.026 
(0.204) 
Census Division FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 First Stage Results for ઢࡵࡼࢃ࢏ࢁࡿ       
Δܫܲ ௜ܹை்ு 0.756
*** 
(0.104) 
0.737*** 
(0.117) 
0.526*** 
(0.121) 
      
Wk Instrument F-Stat  50.76 35.95 18.77       
R2 0.425 0.445 0.502       
Notes: N=340 for all regressions. Observations are at the commuting zone- level and weighted by base-year population.  Robust standard errors are 
clustered by state and reported in parentheses.  First stage regressions and results are identical for the corresponding columns of the mental and physical 
health regressions and are suppressed, as are coefficient estimates for the other covariates in the first stage equation. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table C.3. Local Health Effects by Employment Status 
 Avg Poor Mental 
Days/Month 
Share w/Poor 
Mental Days (ppts) 
Avg Poor Physical 
Days/Month 
Share w/Poor 
Physical Days (ppts) 
Share w/ Fair or Poor 
General Health 
 Panel A: Full Population 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.183** 1.162 0.075 1.267* 1.063** 
 (0.091) (0.748) (0.064) (0.699) (0.427) 
 Panel B: Employed 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.305** 1.597* 0.144 1.891** 0.814 
 (0.121) (0.873) (0.096) (0.866) (0.523) 
 Panel C: Employed Wage Earners 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.322*** 1.696* 0.149* 2.383** 0.932 
 (0.124) (0.925) (0.091) (0.998) (0.586) 
 Panel D: Unemployed 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ -0.642 -4.216 0.347 4.049 4.020* 
 (0.840) (4.468) (0.524) (3.903) (2.331) 
 Panel E: Homemakers 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ -0.449 -2.902* -0.196 -4.968 -0.261 
 (0.312) (1.713) (0.167) (3.055) (0.729) 
Notes: N=340 for the regressions for full population, employed, and employed wage earners, N=312 for unemployed, and N=335 for homemakers. 
Observations are at the commuting zone level and are weighted by base-year share of national population.  All regressions use the preferred specification 
with Census division dummies and the full set of controls from Autor et al. (2013), listed below Table C.2.  Robust standard errors are clustered by state and 
reported in parentheses.  First stage results are available upon request.  Employed wage earners include all employed not classified as self-employed.  
Unemployed persons are those indicated to be out of work (for either less than a year or more than a year), and exclude self-identified retirees, students, and 
homemakers.   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
86 
 
Table C.4. Import Exposure and Health Care Access 
 Share Couldn’t Afford MD Visit (ppts) Share Without Health Plan (ppts) 
 Full Pop. Employed 
Employed 
for Wages Full Pop. Employed 
Employed 
for Wages 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.939
* 
(0.565) 
2.099** 
(1.030) 
2.403**  
(1.097) 
0.787 
(0.522) 
0.497 
(0.540) 
0.930 
(0.627) 
Initial Mfg. Emp. 
Share 
-0.018 
(0.069) 
-0.023* 
(0.131) 
-0.251* 
(0.150) 
0.008 
(0.075) 
0.074 
(0.085) 
0.058 
(0.098) 
Initial Share College-
Educ. 
0.161*** 
(0.053) 
0.117 
(0.073) 
0.146* 
(0.075) 
0.029 
(0.066) 
0.039 
(0.064) 
0.043 
(0.063) 
Initial Share Foreign-
Born 
-0.027 
(0.034) 
-0.007 
(0.053) 
0.002 
(0.051) 
-0.081*** 
(0.030) 
-0.062 
(0.041) 
-0.027 
(0.041) 
Initial Female Emp. 
Rate 
-0.184*** 
(0.071) 
-0.013 
(0.074) 
-0.048 
(0.097) 
-0.122 
(0.084) 
-0.098 
(0.103) 
0.043 
(0.105) 
Initial Emp. Share in 
Routine Occ. 
0.214 
(0.147) 
0.481** 
(0.228) 
0.716*** 
(0.256) 
0.059 
(0.135) 
0.150 
(0.224) 
0.235 
(0.229) 
Avg. Offshorability 
Index of Initial Occ. -1.562 (0.955) 
-3.826** 
(1.689) 
-5.01*** 
(1.769) 
0.295 
(1.083) 
-0.827 
(1.370) 
-2.171 
(1.421) 
Notes: N=340 for all regressions.  All regressions use the preferred specification with Census division dummies and the 
full set of controls from Autor et al. (2013), listed below Table C.2.  Observations are at the commuting zone- level and 
weighted by base-year population.  Robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses.   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
  
87 
 
Table C.5. Robustness Check: Testing for Endogenous Changes in Population Composition 
 Male Share Age White Share Black Share Hispanic Share Other Race Share 
 Panel A: Full Population 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ -0.743 -0.106 -0.945 0.039 0.846 0.060 
 (0.958) (0.226) (0.688) (0.405) (0.556) (0.361) 
 Panel B: Employed 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ -0.818 0.204 -1.432 0.132 0.957 0.343 
 (0.831) (0.367) (0.918) (0.372) (0.745) (0.301) 
 Panel C: Employed Wage Earners 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ -1.040 0.243 -1.690* 0.090 1.388* 0.212 
 (0.873) (0.325) (0.984) (0.379) (0.834) (0.350) 
 Panel D: Unemployed 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.289 1.748* 1.504 -0.485 4.098 -5.117 
 (3.183) (1.056) (1.850) (2.034) (2.901) (3.668) 
 Panel E: Homemakers 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.118 0.686 1.765 0.628 -2.451 0.058 
 (0.396) (0.599) (2.447) (0.622) (2.474) (0.612) 
Notes: N=340 for the regressions for full population, employed, and employed wage earners, N=314 for unemployed, and N=336 for homemakers. 
Observations are at the commuting zone level and are weighted by base-year share of national population.  All outcome variables except for age are 
shares of the respective employment group self-identifying by the demographic trait and measured in percentage points.  All regressions use the 
preferred specification with Census division dummies and the full set of controls from Autor et al. (2013), shown in Table 2.  Robust standard errors are 
clustered by state and reported in parentheses.  First stage results are available upon request.  Employed wage earners include all employed not 
classified as self-employed.  Unemployed persons are those indicated to be out of work (for either less than a year or more than a year), and exclude 
self-identified retirees, students, and homemakers.   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table C.6. Robustness Check: Testing for Pre-trends in Health Correlated with Import Exposure 
 Avg Poor Mental 
Days/Month 
Share w/Poor 
Mental Days (ppts) 
Avg Poor Physical 
Days/Month 
Share w/Poor 
Physical Days (ppts) 
Share w/ Fair or Poor 
General Health 
 Panel A: Full Population 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ -0.395** -1.583 -0.204 -0.591 -0.501 
 (0.179) (1.049) (0.122) (1.156) (0.589) 
 Panel B: Employed 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ -0.338* -2.966* 0.148 -0.090 0.682 
 (0.199) (1.565) (0.111) (0.979) (0.692) 
 Panel C: Employed Wage Earners 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.330* -3.106** 0.192 0.025 0.544 
 (0.186) (1.460) (0.130) (1.158) (0.703) 
 Panel D: Unemployed 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.378 2.314 -0.422 4.951 -2.759 
 (0.813) (3.560) (0.591) (4.556) (2.970) 
 Panel E: Homemakers 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ -0.661* 1.470 0.069 0.488 -0.373 
 (0.344) (2.430) (0.431) (2.462) (1.276) 
Notes: N=186 for the regressions for the unemployed and N=200 for all others.  Observations are at the commuting zone level and are weighted by base-
year share of national population.  All regressions use the preferred specification with Census division dummies and the full set of controls from Autor et al. 
(2013), listed below Table 2.  Robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses.  First stage results are available upon request.  
Employed wage earners include all employed not classified as self-employed.  Unemployed persons are those indicated to be out of work (for either less 
than a year or more than a year), and exclude self-identified retirees, students, and homemakers.   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table C.7. Robustness Check: Pre-period Health Outcomes as a Covariate 
 Avg Poor Mental 
Days/Month 
Share w/Poor 
Mental Days (ppts)
Avg Poor Physical 
Days/Month 
Share w/Poor 
Physical Days (ppts) 
Share w/ Fair or 
Poor General Health
 Panel A: Full Population 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.134 0.408 0.067 0.787 0.746* 
 (0.096) (0.491) (0.077) (0.543) (0.402) 
Pre-Period Health 
Outcome 
-0.237***
(0.066) 
-0.331***
(0.063) 
-0.131* 
(0.078) 
-0.237*** 
(0.075) 
-0.264*** 
(0.078) 
 Panel B: Employed 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.256** 0.985 0.058 1.084 0.148 
 (0.124) (0.783) (0.103) (0.681) (0.289) 
Pre-Period Health 
Outcome 
-0.094
(0.080) 
-0.305***
(0.061) 
-0.090 
(0.103) 
-0.238*** 
(0.082) 
-0.239 
(0.147) 
 Panel C: Employed Wage Earners 
Δܫܲ ௜ܹ௎ௌ 0.277** 1.155 0.056 1.489** 0.190 
 (0.122) (0.792) (0.082) (0.709) (0.301) 
Pre-Period Health 
Outcome 
-0.055
(0.084) 
-0.301***
(0.066) 
-0.109 
(0.089) 
-0.247*** 
(0.078) 
-0.240* 
(0.143) 
Notes: N=311 for all regressions for full population, employed, and employed wage earners.   Pre-period health outcomes are the average values for 1998 
and 1999.  Observations are at the commuting zone level and are weighted by base-year share of national population.  All regressions use the preferred 
specification with Census division dummies and the full set of controls from Autor et al. (2013), listed below Table 2.  Robust standard errors are clustered 
by state and reported in parentheses.  First stage results are available upon request.  Employed wage earners include all employed not classified as self-
employed.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure C.1. Distribution of Health Measures Across Commuting Zones 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three studies in economics.  The first chapter studies the 
effects of social scrutiny on behaviors that signal academic ability using a new laboratory 
experiment.  Subjects in the experiment are paid for correctly answering verbal analogy 
questions taken from either a harder or easier set. Payments are carefully calibrated so 
that high-ability participants tend to make more money attempting the hard questions 
while low-types make more attempting the easy questions. This makes choosing the hard 
questions a credible signal of academic ability, and the results of the experiment support 
this.  In treatment, subjects reveal to others in the experiment which questions they 
attempted.  Contrary to predictions from the social psychology literature, we find that 
social observation pushes subjects away from choosing the signal of intelligence, despite 
evidence that it was privately valuable.  These results suggest that, in some settings, 
social scrutiny may push people away from behaviors that signal their intelligence and 
ability.  
 The second chapter of this dissertation is an empirical study of the effects of trade 
shocks on worker safety and health.  Our theoretical model explains that firms shift 
resources away from worker safety and into investments to increase output when they 
face greater competition and risk of shutdown.  The model therefore predicts that import 
shocks, robustly shown to decrease firm survival, increase worker injury rates, especially 
at the smallest and least productive firms which are at the greatest risk of being pushed 
out of the market.  To test this prediction empirically, we identify the effects of Chinese 
import shocks in the US in 1996-2007 on worker injury rates at US manufacturers in 
competing industries.  The results demonstrate that injury rates rise in industries hit with 
import competition, particularly at smaller establishments, and the effects persist over at 
least five years. The magnitude of the effects and the implied welfare implications are 
significant: per our back of the envelope exercise, injury rates increase by 13 percent on 
average at the smallest establishments in the sample, and this costs worker welfare the 
equivalent of a 1 to 2 percent fall in their wage.    
 The final chapter studies the effects of import competition on broader health 
measures throughout affected regions.  We find that Chinese import exposure in US local 
labor markets significantly worsens average mental, physical, and general health.  The 
effects are greatest for self-reported mental health and among the employed in affected 
regions, consistent with evidence from the health literature on the consequences of job 
insecurity and wage losses.  Further, we find that import exposure significantly increases 
the share of a region’s population which is unable to afford medical care. Together, the 
latter two chapters of this dissertation provide some of the first evidence that trade shocks 
affect welfare through changes in physical and mental health, as well as access to 
healthcare.  These findings have implications for trade, health, and regulatory policy, and 
they motivate further studies on the non-pecuniary effects of trade shocks. 
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